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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to pension funding failures and concern that abuses in the
private pension system were denying benefits to many workers, Congress passed
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' ERISA has
several specific objectives: to ensure that workers receive pension benefits after
they satisfy certain minimum requirements, to ensure that sufficient funds are set
aside to pay promised pension benefits, to ensure that workers receive adequate
information about their employee benefit plans, and to set higher standards of
conduct for those managing employee benefits and pension funds.2 ERISA has
been successful in accomplishing many of its goals. 3 Today employees vest
earlier, more plans are adequately funded, and plan participants are more
knowledgeable about their retirement benefits.4 Moreover, since the passage of
ERISA, increased participation and contribution rates in private pension plans
have caused the average income of retired individuals to be comparable to that
of the rest of the population.'
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, better known as ERISA, is a
massive piece of legislation. ERISA, Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Titles 26 and 29 U.S.C.). It originated as early as 1962 when
President John F. Kennedy commissioned a special cabinet-level task force to evaluate the
impact of private retirement programs on the nation's economy and public policy, as well as the
investment policies of these programs and whether they were sufficient to provide promised
benefits to the participants. See 120 Cong. Rec. S 15,743 (1974) (statement of'Sen. Javits). More
than a decade later, on September 2, 1974, President Ford signed ERISA into law. ERISA
completely revised the legal framework of the qualified pension plan. Enforcement of significant
innovations of ERISA were divided among the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor,
and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act [ERISA] to protect... the interests
of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct. responsibility
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans ... by requiring them to vest
the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet
minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c) (1999).
3. The growth of the pension system has resulted in an enormous accumulation of
pension assets. Private and public pension funds currently hold more than S4.5 trillion in assets.
This staggering sum reveals that a very large percentage of personal savings and of aggregate
capital formation in the United States occurs through the medium of pension plans. Paul
Yakoboski et al., PBGC Solvency- Balancing Social and Casualty Insurance Perspectives,
Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 126, 5-6 (May 1992) [hereinafter PBGC
Solvency].
4. See generally John R. Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return
on Investment?, 68 St. John's L Rev. 527, 528 (1994).
5. Although much attention has been devoted to the widely known decrease in




Retirement plans are divided into two distinct categories: defined benefit
plans and defined contribution plans.6 Both types of plans can have similar
income replacement objectives and can be used equally effectively for retirement
saving purposes.' Structurally, however, the two types of plans are very
different; the distinguishing feature is risk allocation.' A defined benefit plan
pools the plan's assets in an aggregate trust fund and promises a fixed amount
to plan participants at retirement regardless of investment performance.9 In a
focused on the reversal of these trends during the last several years. See Paul Yakoboski & Celia
Silverman, Baby Boomers in Retirement: What are Their Prospects? Employee Benefit Research
Institute Issue Brief No. 151, 14-15 (July 1994); see also William F. May, Future Policies for
Employer-Based Pension Plans, in Search for a National Retirement Income Policy 101, 103
(Jack L. VanDerhei ed., 1987). The bulk of retirement income increasingly comes from
employer sponsored pension plans. Id. at 14-15. As of 1983, one thousand of the largest
nonfederal pension plans held assets of approximately $806 billion. Id. at 102-04. A nation wide
survey in May 1983 by the Employee Benefit Research Institute and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services indicated that approximately 56% of the 88 million nonfarm
workers in America were covered by a private pension plan. See John H. Langbein & Bruce A.
Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 25 (2d ed. 1995) (citation omitted). In 1993,
participation increased so that private and public pension plans held more than $4.6 trillion in
assets. See id. at 20, 736 (citation omitted). This figure represents more than a 300% increase
from 1983. See id.
6. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1999) (defining "defined contribution
plan" as a "pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for
benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any
income ... which may be allocated to such participant's account"); id., ERISA § 3(35), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1999) (defining "defined benefit plan" as a "pension plan.., which is not
an individual account plan and which provides a benefit derived from employer contributions
which is based partly on the balance of the separate account of a participant"); see also Keville,
supra note 4, at 528; Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages
and Benefits, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1421, 1489 (1993).
7. In a defined contribution plan the expected benefit may not be received because
of inadequate investment performance, or because plan participants may decline to make
elective contributions. Daniel I. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An Evaluation
of ERISA, 17 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 739, 775-76 (1976) (stating "it is necessary to decide
whether defined contribution plans in fact do not promise a specific benefit. Money purchase
plans have a fixed contribution which under ERISA must be made annually. While profit-
sharing plans do not have a definite contribution, in many circumstances the employer fully
intends to contribute the maximum permissible amount.").
8. Daniel I Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational Model for the
21st Century, in Search for a National Retirement Income Policy 159, 184 (Jack L. VanDerhei
ed., 1987).
9. See Jon Fitzpatrick, Determining if a Small Company Needs a Retirement Plan,
and Choosing the Best Plan, 14 Tax'n for Law. 76, 78 (1985) (discussing the two types of
plans).
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defined benefit plan the sponsoring employer is liable for the payment of plan
benefits and therefore bears the risk of accumulating insufficient assets.
To protect defined benefit plan participants in the event that an employer
becomes insolvent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures
a limited accrued benefit, which is phased in over a five-year period."0 The
maximum insurable benefit is approximately $35,000 per year for an individual
who retires at age 65." To the extent that a participant's vested retirement
benefit exceeds the maximum insurable limit, the participant bears the risk of
insolvency. Relatively few plan participants, however, have vested accrued
benefits in excess of the insurable limit.' 2
In contrast to the defined benefit plan's aggregate trust, a defined
contribution plan assigns each participant an individual account.13 At retirement
the participant receives the entire account balance. The relative success or failure
10. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (1999). Section 1302(a) details why Congress
created the PBGC. One of the purposes behind the creation of the PBGC was "to provide for the
timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under
plans to which this subchapter applies." Id. § 1302(a)(2).
11. When a plan terminates with insufficient assets, the PBGC is required to pay
accrued, vested benefits to plan participants up to a guaranteed amount. ERISA limits the "basic
guaranteed benefit" payable by the PBGC to the lesser of the average monthly gross income,
based on the highest compensation in any consecutive five-year period, or $750 per month,
adjusted by the cost of living. See 29 C.F.R. § 4022.22 (1999). Basic benefits "include all
retirement, death, and disability benefits of current retirees and, for vested current participants,
the regular retirenient benefit payable under the normal annuity form." Alicia H. Munnell,
ERISA-The First Decade: Was the Legislation Consistent With Other National Goals?. 19 U.
Mich. J.L Ref. 51, 54 (1985). "Basic benefits do not include lump-sum and special
supplementary benefits payable under some plans to encourage early retirement." Id. ERISA
also imposes a limit on the insured amounts. For example, in 1998, the PBGC insured up to a
maximum monthly benefit of $2,880.68, $34,568.16 per year, payable in the form of a life
annuity commencing at age 65 to a participant in a plan that terminated in 1998. See Pension
Guarantees, <http'//www.pbgc.gov/ygptabl.htni>, Mar. 1999; 29 C.F.R. § 4022.22(b) (1999).
ERISAinitiallyprovided that upon plan termination, employers were liable to the PBGC forany
plan asset insufficiencies up to a maximum of 30% of the employer's net worth, and the PBGC
absorbed the excess liability. The 30% cap gave employers an incentive to terminate their plans
when their unfunded insured liability exceeded 30% of the employer's net worth. ERISA was
amended in 1986 to avoid this result. The Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1986 (SEPPAA) limited the employer's ability to terminate plans with unfunded vested accrued
benefits. Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-272, 100 Stat.
237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
12. Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 831. Thus, the guaranteed benefit can differ
drastically from the benefit promised by the plan.
13. Defined contribution plans provide individual accounts for each participant.
Benefits are based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, with
adjustments for anyincome, expenses, gains, and losses. Account balances also maybe adjusted
for forfeitures of the accounts of other participants. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1999).
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of the plan depends on how well the assets have been invested.'4 There is no
PBGC protection because the retirement benefit is determined by the account
balance, and not by a specific benefit. 5 Thus, in a defined contribution plan, the
participant, rather than the employer and the PBGC, bears the risk of
accumulating insufficient assets for retirement.1
6
The most important objective of a retirement program is to provide a
level of replacement income during retirement sufficient to provide a life style
commensurate with that of an individual during her working life.'7 In both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, the income replacement goal can
be seriously threatened by fiduciary breach, poor investment, or inadequate
funding.' 8 When one or all of these events occur, however, it is more likely that
defined contribution plans ultimately will provide retirement benefits that fall
short of their goals because such plans are neither PBGC insured nor adequately
protected by the fiduciary and funding rules.
14. Douglas A. Love, ERISA: The Law Versus Economics, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 135, 136
(1990).
15. The PBGC is to provide broad insurance coverage for pension plans, but with
limits: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this subchapter applies to any
plan ..." 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1999). The most important exception for defined contribution
plans: "This section does not apply to any plan-(l) which is an individual account plan [a
defined contribution plan] .... Id. § 1321(b). Thus, defined contribution plans are not insured
by the PBGC. With no particular, identifiable benefit, there is no appropriate amount to insure.
See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-383 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,4911. The PBGC
requires minimum funding standards to be met as a condition of protection, but the funding
standards set out by the IRC and ERISA generally do not apply to defined contribution plans
since by their nature the amount of funding is merely the individual account balance. See Jay
Conison, Employee Benefit Plans in a Nutshell 413 (1993).
16. See Deborah S. Prutzman & Edwin C. Laurenson, Impact of ERISA on Choice
of Mutual or Collective Investment Funds as Funding Vehicles, 651 PU/Comm 789, 805 (Feb.-
Mar. 1993); Yakoboski et al., PBGC Solvency, supra note 3, at 4; see also infra Part IB.C.I.
17. A large gap exists between what most people expect to receive during their
retirement and what they actually will receive. "[A] secure retirement will depend on having a
three-legged stool of income from Social Security, an employer-sponsored pension, and personal
savings." Susan Mitchell, How Boomers Save, Am. Demog., Sept. 1994, at 22. Most have not
saved enough to meet their demands. See Steven Brostoff, Workers Save More for Retirement;
Still Fall Short, Nat'l Underwriter Life & Health Fin. Svcs. Ed. Dec. 23, 1996, at 6. The annual
Workplace Pulse survey for 1996, sponsored by Colonial Life and Accident and ECFC, stated
that the average 30-year-old worker would have to save $662 more each year "to achieve an
annual retirement income of $26,256 in 1996 dollars." Id. The survey also stated that "[a] 60-
year-old worker with $140,000 already saved for retirement would need to save an additional
$2,325 a month to achieve an annual retirement income of $26,256." Id. "Married-couple
households headed by 35-to-44-year-olds with a total income of $40,000 to $60,000 a year need
to save $200,000 by age 65 to maintain a similar standard of living after retirement, if they have
a pension. Those without a pension need to save $270,000." Mitchell, infra, at 25.
18. See discussions infra Part I.B; Part ILC; and Part IV.A.
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When ERISA was enacted, defined benefit was the predominant plan
type.'9 Defined contribution plans typically were used as supplemental plans.
Since the passage of ERISA, the composition of the private pension system has
changed dramatically.' In recent years, there has been a discernable movement
toward using defined contribution plans as primary retirement saving vehicles.2 '
This trend has serious implications for the private pension system because it
shifts the risk of accumulating insufficient retirement assets from the sponsoring
19. Between 1975, the year ERISA became effective, and 1990, the total number of
private defined benefit plans increased from 103,000 in 1975 to 175,000 in 1983, then fell to
113,000 in 1990. Celia Silverman et al., Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Databook
on Employee Benefits 139 (3rd ed. 1995) [hereinafter EBRI Databook]. Meanwhile, the total
number of private defined contribution plans increased from 208,000 in 1975 to 599,000 in
1990. Id.
20. The composition of the workforce has changed as well. See EBRI Databook, supra
note 19, at 7-10. The number of workers between the ages of 55 and 64 will increase from 11.3
million in 1970 to 17.4 million in 2005. See Gerald Cole & Marjorie N. Taylor, Caught
Between Demographics and the Deficit: How Can Retirement Plans Meet the Challenges
Ahead?, Comp. & Ben. Review 32, 32 (Jan.-Feb. 1996). This increase in the number of older
workers is predicted to result in a skills gap between generations. More jobs are predicted to
be open, however they will be entry level positions. The older generation will create what is
termed the "graybeard ceiling" by staying in upper level positions, preventing advancement and
training for the next generation. When the baby boomers finally retire, the next generation will
be too under-skilled to move into their positions. See Ron Stodghill, IL The Coming Job
Bottleneck, Bus. Wk., Mar. 24, 1997, at 184. Not only is the workforce aging rapidly, but it is
becoming increasingly transient. "American workers born after World War II will have at least
10 jobs over the course of their working lives. Vorkers who do not remain at a single job for a
long period are better served by defined contribution plans" because they vest immediately and
are easily rolled into a new employer's plan or individual retirement account. Keville, supra
note 4, at 542 (footnotes omitted). But see Yakoboski & Silverman. supra note 5. at 21-27.
Yakoboski and Silverman argue that boomers are, in fact, expected to have longer tenure figures
(as of retirement) than previous generations, so they could not be more mobile. See id. at 23-24.
Boomers already had higher tenure levels than their predecessors when they hit age groups 25-
34 and 35-44 in 1991, and tenure levels were higher in the 1980s and 90s for both men and
women than in the 1950s, 60s, or 70s. See id. Yakoboski and Silverman also posit that the
increase in the number of defined contribution plan participants is due mostly to small firms
adding the plans, especially 401(k) plans, where they previously had none. See id at 21-23.
21. As a percentage of the total number of private pension plans, the number of
defined benefit plans fell from 33% in 1975 to 16% in 1990. See Yakoboski & Silverman. supra
note 5, at 21 (Table 14). Defined contribution plan have increased as a percentage of aggregate
private pensions from 67% in 1975 to 84% in 1990. See id. As of the end of 1992, private
defined benefit plans held $1.57 trillion in assets and private defined contribution plans held
$911 billion. Similar changes took place with regard to the number of participants in defined
contribution and defined benefit plans between 1975 and 1990; however, the number of
participants in defined benefit plans continues to exceed the number of participants in defined
contribution plans. Id.; see also Keville, supra note 4, at 529. However, recent trends show an
increase in the establishment of defined contribution plans so that in a few years defined




employer to the employee. The use of defined contribution plans as primary
savings vehicles also eliminates the significance of many of the protective
measures introduced by ERISA.2 Consequently, unless Congress amends the
pension law as it applies to defined contribution plans, many future retirees may
not receive the retirement benefits that they expect, or the level of protection
envisioned by the drafters of ERISA. The prospect of benefit shortfalls in defined
contribution plans will become an increasingly serious societal problem as more
and more participants depend on them for their retirement security.
B. The Shift From Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans are more attractive than defined benefit plans
to employers for several reasons. First, there are fewer costs and administrative
burdens associated with establishing and maintaining defined contribution plans
than defined benefit plans. For example, in defined contribution plans there are
no fees for actuarial services,' and no PBGC premiums for PBGC insurance.24
Thus, defined contribution plans are an attractive alternative for the cost-
conscious employer.
Second, more onerous regulations are imposed on employers who
sponsor defined benefit plans than those who sponsor defined contribution plans.
Over the last decade, changes to the laws governing private pensions have
disproportionately affected defined benefit plans.' As a result, defined benefit
plan sponsors find it necessary to amend their plans frequently to comply with
complex new laws and regulations. 6 Burdensome regulation is often given as the
22. The reallocation of risk has been manifested by not only an increase in the number
of defined contribution plans but also a decrease in the number of defined benefit plans. See
generally, Advisory Council: DOL Report Will Highlight Ongoing Shift in Pension Plans, 20
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2023 (Sept. 27, 1993). The shift towards defined contribution plans
can also be seen in the changing composition of private primary plans. See EBRI Databook,
supra note 19, at 13945. There was a decrease of 56,651 in the number of private primary
defined benefit plans between 1985 and 1990. See id. at 140. Meanwhile, between 1985 and
1990, the number of private primary defined contribution plans increased by 149,078. See id.
However, most of this shift has taken place among small plans with two to nine participants. See
id.
23. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 274 (discussing actuarial fees and
assumptions); see also generally Halperin, supra note 8, at 186-88.
24. The PBGC premium must be paid by all employers who maintain defined benefit
plans. See generally Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 93-94, 830-31, 854-55. For a discussion
of the impact of the PBGC premium on the pension system's structure, see infra Part Ill.F.2.
25. See Defined Benefit Plans: Employers Offer No Replacements in More Than One-
Third of Terminations, Benefits Today, Jul. 1992, at 223.
26. See Vineeta Anand, IRS Cuts Some Slack on Retirement Rules, Pens. & Inv., Jan.
10, 1994, at 4; Congress May Ruin the Party, Bus. Ins., Sep. 7, 1992, at 8; see also Keville,
supra note 4, at 540. Another reason not discussed in the text above that employers may prefer
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single most important reason underlying the recent shift to defined contribution
plans.27
The reasons employees prefer defined contribution plans are different
from those of the employer, and often relate to custom, flexibility, and participant
involvement, rather than the inherent characteristics of the plan.28 For example,
defined contribution plans typically have more liberal vesting schedules than
defined benefit plans.29 Also, some defined contribution plans allow pre-
separation distributions; others give participants control over the investment of
their plan assets. 0
defined contribution plans is that the annual cost is not fixed in certain defined contribution
plans, such as discretionary profit sharing plans or profit sharing plans with contribution
formulas tied to profits. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 42-43 (citing Peter T. Scott, A
National Retirement Income Policy, 44 Tax Notes 913, 919-20 (1989)). Therefore, employers
may have more flexibility in lowering their level of annual contribution during economic down-
turns. In contrast, the annual contribution to a defined benefit plan is determined by the
experience of the plan with respect to employee turnover, death, and investment returns in a
given year. Id. at 274. Thus, from year to year the employer's contribution to a defined benefit
plan (which is generally not tied to profits) will fluctuate but cannot be decreased or increased
at the employeres discretion. See ReginaT. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How Much
is Too Much?, 44 Case XV. Res. L Rev. 1, 27 n.153 (1993). Even with funding flexibility,
however, most plans are subject to the minimum funding rules to protect against underfunding.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1999); IRC § 412; Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 273. There
are also caps under ERISA on deductible contributions to prevent tax manipulation through
overfunding. See IRC §§ 404(a)(1)(A)(iii), 412.
27. The American Academy of Actuaries conducted a survey of employers that found
that terminations of defined benefit plans are occurring in part, because of excessive government
regulation. See Jerry Geisel, Weighty Rules Crush Pension Plans, Bus. Ins.. Mar. 22, 1993, at
3. For example, studies suggest that prolonged rulemaking by the IRS on the nondiscrimination
requirements for defined benefit plans created too much uncertainty, and therefore contributed
to the termination of around 40,000 small defined benefit plans between 1986 and 1993. Deirdre
Fretz, The IRS Redefines Benefit Plans, Inst. Investor, Apr. 1993, at 149.
28. Another significant reason that defined contribution plans are often selected by
employees as the plan type of choice is because the defined contribution plan structure is more
advantageous to the more mobile members of the workforce with respect to the way it measures
vested benefits. For example, if an employee terminates employment at age 35 after 10 years
of service and the retirement benefit provided by the plan is I% per year of service times final
compensation, the participant would have earned 10% at the time of termination. In contrast,
in a defined benefit plan, the contribution level anticipates a certain level of benefits based on
estimated final pay, thus, the percentage of contribution and the accumulation at anygiven point
will be greater than if no increase in pay were anticipated. See Halperin, supra note 8. at 185-
86.
29. See IRC § 411 (providing minimum vesting standards for qualified plans); see
also generally Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 109-14. Although not required by the
minimum vesting standards, the vesting standards have historically been more generous in
defined contribution plans. Id. However, no rules prevent a defined benefit plan from being just
as liberal in its vesting and distribution rules.
30. These plans are referred to as participant directed plans. See infra Part ILC. 1; see
20001
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C. Shortfalls in Defined Contribution Plans
Notwithstanding ERISA's general success in improving the funding and
delivery of retirement benefits, several areas of current pension law are
particularly inadequate in preventing shortfalls in defined contribution plans.
First, in defined contribution plans, the fiduciary rules do not provide the same
level of protection as they do in defined benefit plans. Historically, ERISA's
fiduciary rules focused on employer mismanagement and the unauthorized use
of plan assets.3 ' In defined contribution plans, however, it is often the employee
rather than the employer who makes the allocation and investment decisions
regarding plan assets. In such plans, the employers' liability for poor investment
performance as a plan fiduciary is reduced; consequently, many of the fiduciary
rules are irrelevant for such plans.3" Thus, participant involvement creates
tension between individual choice and the retirement benefit protection provided
by the fiduciary laws. On the one hand, participant involvement is desirable
because it allows employees to be more active in the management of their
retirement assets; on the other hand, when participants who lack financial
expertise make investment decisions, their assets are often exposed to much
greater risks.
A second reason defined contribution plan participants are more likely
to experience shortfalls in their retirement benefits is because the insurance
program for retirement plans has a gap in its insurance protection. As mentioned
earlier, defined benefit plans are insured by the PBGC, whereas defined
contribution plans are not. Defined contribution plans are not insured because
there is a reluctance on the part of policymakers to insure investment
also Michael J. Canan, Qualified Retirement and Other Employee Benefit Plans § 16.3, at 787-
88 (1996 student ed.); Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 50-51, 347-48; John J. McGrath,
Integration of Benefits and Allocation Formula, 402 PLI/Tax 385, 414 (1997).
31. "Most of [ERISA's] fiduciary standards represent a codification of the common
law of trusts." Elaine McClatchey Darroch, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates: The Supreme Court's
Dismantling of Civil Enforcement Under ERISA, 1994 Det. C.L. Rev. 1089, 1092. The fiduciary
standards were included in ERISA as a response by Congress to the "kickbacks, embezzlement,
outrageous administrative costs, and excessive investments in the securities of plan
sponsors/employers" discovered through Senate committee investigations in the 1950s. Id.
32. In some instances, the fiduciaryrules have been used to provide only limited relief
for fiduciary breaches in defined contribution plans. "If a participant... exercises control over
the assets in his account, the fiduciaries of the plan will not be liable for any loss or for any
breach of fiduciary duty which is the result of the participant's exercise of control." Joseph R.
Simone & Glenn E. Butash, Statutory Framework, "Language" and Fiduciary Responsibility
Provisions of ERISA, 385 PLI/Tax 7, 28 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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performance, as opposed to calculable retirement benefits. 3 Interestingly, the
distinction between insuring investment performance and insuring calculable
benefits is largely one of perception. Although insuring a minimum return in a
defined contribution plan may appear problematic and incompatible with the
existing defined benefit plan insurance model, a guarantee of a minimum
investment return can be exactly what occurs in a defined benefit plan under
current law.
The disparate treatment of investment performance in the two types of
plans can be illustrated best by contrasting a traditional defined contribution
plan, such as a profit sharing plan, 34 with a non-traditional cash balance plan.
35
The cash balance plan is a hybrid plan that has design features of a defined
contribution plan, but in actuality is a defined benefit plan. 6 The cash balance
plan promises benefits in the form of a hypothetical account which increases with
annual pay credits and annual interest credits.37 The pay credits are determined
in the same manner as employer contributions are determined in a profit sharing
plan.38 Unlike the profit sharing plan, however, the cash balance plan guarantees
an annual interest rate credit which is a proxy for investment earnings.39
33. See infra Part IILD.
34. A profit-sharing plan is a plan which provides for the participation in the
employer's profits by the employees. See Canan, supra note 30, at § 3.11, at 93. The plan must
have a predetermined formula for distribution of contributions made to the plan among the
participants at some fixed point in time, e.g., retirement or death. See id.
35. The cash balance plan operates very much like the profit sharing plan in terms
of the contribution formula, but the retirement benefit itself is based on specific provisions of
the plan document rather than the actual experience of each account. See Plan Administration:
IRS Updating COBRARegulations to Provide New Guidance, Consultant Says, 19 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 592 (Apr. 6, 1992) [hereinafter COBRA]. In 1985, the cash balance plan was
introduced by the Bank of America. The bank concluded that a defined contribution-like plan
would be more effective than the social security offset pension plan it maintained at the time in
giving more mobile workers a reason to "... . stay one more year." However, switching to a
defined contribution plan would have lowered benefits for senior employees approaching
retirement age. A defined contribution plan also would have transferred the investment risk to
all employees. Additionally, changing to a defined contribution plan would have required
terminating the existing plan, and that could have had adverse tax consequences. Thus, the cash
balance plan was created to allow Bank of America to achieve its goal without the problems that
would result from switching to a defined contribution plan. Vincent Amoroso, Cash Balance
Plans, 15 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 339 (Feb. 22, 1988).
36. Amoroso, supra note 35, at 339. As a defined benefit plan, the cash balance plan
is subject to the funding rules of IRC. See IRC § 412. See infra Part I.E. Contribution levels
are determined using actuarial assumptions for investment earnings, turnover, and death. See
John Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 78.
37. See COBRA, supra note 35, at 592.
38. The pay credits are not related to the plan asset levels. Id.
39. The interest rate credit is generally related to a nonstatic indicator, such as the
yield on treasury instruments. Annuity benefits under a cash balance plan are determined by a
formula that converts the account balance into a monthly benefit. Alternatively, participants may
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In a cash balance plan, as with all other defined benefit plans, the
employer, rather than the employee, assumes the primary investment risk. Thus,
for example, if the cash balance plan assumes an interest return of ten percent,
and the actual investment return is five percent, the employer would be
responsible for the difference between the assumed rate of return and the actual
experience of the plan.n° If the employer were unable to make the additional
contribution, the PBGC would be liable to the extent of the participants' vested
accrued benefits.4'
Therefore, in reality the PBGC does insure against the failure to earn the
expected rate of return in defined benefit plans. Under similar circumstances,
however, there would be no protection in a defined contribution plan. As a result,
a defined contribution plan participant would experience a shortfall in her
expected retirement benefit.4"
Because the shift from traditional defined benefit plans to more flexible
savings arrangements is more commonly accomplished by means of conventional
defined contribution plans, such as money purchase plans and profit sharing
plans rather than cash balance plans, protection against unfavorable investment
returns will be unavailable for increasing numbers of participants in defined
contribution plans.43 As the use of hybrid plans such as cash balance plans
expands, the continued reliance on plan classification to determine insurance
protection eligibility will become increasingly confusing, and create more and
more anomalous results. This situation is particularly disturbing since the cash
balance plan is functionally similar to a defined contribution plan.
Insufficient funding of the expected retirement benefit is the third reason
defined contribution plan participants may not receive the retirement benefits
they expect. When a plan is established, a participant's projected retirement
elect to receive lump-sum distributions when they terminate employment. Like defined
contribution plans, cash balance plans provide greater benefits to employees who terminate
employment before reaching retirement age. Id. Unlike the typical defined contribution plan,
however, additional benefits in the event of disability, or death and ad hoc retirement increases
can be made available in the cash balance plan. Id. Although the cash balance plan provides for
optional form of payment as a lump sum, the PBGC does not guarantee the lump sum value of
participants benefits; the PBGC guarantees only straight life annuity payments.
40. The cash balance plan falls within the broad coverage of ERISA § 4022 which
provides that the PBGC shall guarantee the payment of all accrued benefits up to the limit under
a single employer plan that terminates with insufficient assets. As a result, the cash balance plan
is protected by the federal insurance program.
41. ERISA provides in pertinent part that the PBGC "guarantee[s]... the payment
of all nonforfeitable benefits.., under a single-employer plan which terminates at a time when
[ERISA section 4021] applies to it." 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1999).
42. See discussion infra Part II.D.
43. See discussion infra Part ID; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(1) (1999) (providing
that protection is unavailable to individual account plans); Keville, supra note 4, at 556
(discussing the lack of PBGC protection for defined contribution plans).
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benefit can be divided into two essential parts: (1) the portion attributable to the
future; and (2) the portion attributable to the past. When newly established plans
give credit for past service, the plans incur liabilities for prior years of service,
although they have not accumulated any assets. Plans typically fund their initial
past service liabilities over thirty-year periodsf' Thus, assuming that there are
no benefit increases and the actual assumptions are correct, if the plan continues
to operate for at least thirty years, there is no risk of a funding shortage. If the
plan terminates before the funding period has run, however, there may be
insufficient contributions to cover the portion of the benefit attributable to past
service.
Although defined contribution plans generally do not provide explicitly
for past service, many of them do provide for such benefits implicitly.4"
However, because the PBGC fails to insure not only benefits attributable to
future service in defined contribution plans, but also those attributable to past
service, the past service benefit is not protected. Thus, defined contribution plan
participants are more likely to experience shortfalls in both the past and future
portions of their expected retirement benefits.
In defined contribution plans, just as in defined benefit plans, when
shortfalls occur with respect to the past service benefit, it is because the employer
fails to make sufficient contributions, not because unfavorable investment
performance has occurred. Accordingly, in both types of plans the portions of the
expected retirement benefit attributable to past service are equally insurable and
pre-fundable. Therefore, even if one believes that there should be no protection
in defined contribution plans of the portion of the expected retirement benefit
attributable to future service because the benefit depends on future investment
performance, one could view the portion of the retirement benefit based on past
service credit very differently.
Because current pension law provides defined contribution plans
inadequate protection, the shift from traditional defined benefit plans to more
flexible defined contribution plans as primary retirement saving vehicles
compromises ERISA's goal of guaranteeing the delivery of expected retirement
benefits. This result is not inevitable, however. In order to provide the protection
Congress intended to confer upon private pension plan retirees when it enacted
ERISA, the fiduciary and funding laws should be amended. Additionally,
insurance protection should be extended to all, or some portion, of the defined
44. The serious underfunding of several large plans was caused by the 30-year
funding period for past service credits. Thus, the Pension Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-33 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), required more
rapid funding of underfunded plans due to concerns about the solvency of the defined benefit
plan system. For more information on minimum funding standards, see 29 U.S.C. § 1082
(1999); IRC § 412(1).
45. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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contribution plan benefit, in order to prevent shortfalls in the expected retirement
benefits of defined contribution plans.
This article explores the feasibility of each of these suggestions, and
separately analyzes the impact of the following in defined contribution plans: (1)
inadequate fiduciary rules; (2) unfavorable investment performance; (3) lack of
insurance protection; and (4) inadequate funding practices. This article concludes
that the impact of theserisks is extremely disparate between defined benefit plans
and defined contribution plans. Part II shows that inadequate fiduciary rules
threaten the success of ERISA as the use of defined contribution plans as
primary savings vehicles escalates. Part I demonstrates a need for insurance
protection against unfavorable investment performance in defined contribution
plans, and proposes an insurance model to resolve existing inequities among
participants in the two types of plans. Part IV determines that past service credits
in defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans are indistinguishable; con-
sequently, at a minimum, the portion of the expected retirement benefit attribut-
able to past service warrants pre-funding, or some level of insurance protection.
I. THE PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAM AND THE FIDUCIARY LAW
A. Fiduciary Standards
One of the primary goals of ERISA is to establish higher fiduciary
standards in order to provide greater protection of retirement benefits.46 Although
ERISA has been relatively successful in achieving this goal, recent developments
in fiduciary law threaten its success, potentially placing plan participants in a
more disadvantageous position than they were in prior to the passage of ERISA.
Before ERISA, the state common law of trusts and the Internal Revenue
Code governed a trustee's conduct in the administration and investment of
pension assets.4 7 Common law doctrine required the trustee "to make such
46. See 120 Cong. Rec. S15,738, 15,741 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 5186-87 (statement of Sen. Williams).
47. Until 1974, the Internal Revenue Code's exclusive benefit rule, still in effect
today, prescribed the only federal guidelines applicable to plan fiduciaries. The exclusive benefit
rule provided that a plan would not qualify for preferential tax treatment if it was not maintained
for the exclusive benefit of plan participants and their beneficiaries. IRC § 401(a). Historically,
courts have not rigidly enforced the exclusive benefit rule, and the IRS has had a practice of not
penalizing investments whose primary purpose is for the benefit of plan participants and their
beneficiaries, in spite of their contemporaneous generation of collateral benefits for others. See
Shelby U.S. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979); Maria O'Brien Hylton,
"Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42
Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 38 (1992); see also IRC § 404 (a)(1)(A)(i), (c)(l). For further discussion of the
exclusive benefit rule, see Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 649. An employee benefit plan
fiduciary's behavior was also judicially reviewable under the Taft-Hartley Act. See Labor-
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investments... as a prudent [person] would make of his own property.""4 The
common law of trusts also imposed a duty of loyalty on the trustee and governed
the remedies available to plan participants and their beneficiaries in the event of
fiduciary breach.'
Currently, ERISA delegates to the federal government the duty of
establishing all pension policy and law." While ERISA preempts state law,
including the state common law of trusts, ERISA's fiduciary standards are rooted
in state common law tradition and pre-ERISA regulations. Like the common law,
ERISA regulates fiduciary activities and protects pension assets from
mismanagement, fraud, and bankruptcy. Under ERISA, a fiduciary's conduct is
governed by the "prudent [person] rule,"'" the general fiduciary standards of
ERISA section 404, and the prohibited transaction rules of ERISA section 40602
Commentators are in general agreement that Congress intended the
prudent person rule to be applied more liberally under ERISA than was
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L No. 80-101, 61 Star. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1998)). The Act provided that multi-employer
plans must be in the form of a trust arrangement. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1998). The Act
provides federal jurisdiction for claims seeking enforcement of a collective bargaining
agreement requiring maintenance or funding of an employee benefit plan. Id. at § 185(c). The
Act was used to challenge fiduciary action under an arbitrary and capricious standard. This
standard was incorporated into ERISA common law, but was modified by the Court. See Terese
M. Connerton, Suits by Beneficiaries Against Plans or Employers to Recover Benefits, SB68
A.LI-AB.A. 569,614-15 (1997) (discussing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101 (1989)). The Act was a "relatively weak and incomplete effortD to regulate employee
benefit plans." Catherine L Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract
in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 Ohio St. LJ. 153, 162 (1995).
48. Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule) § 181 (1992). Harvard
College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, first enunciated the traditional standard of the trust
fiduciary, that the trustee act how "men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their
own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested." Arnory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461.
49. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Danger of Ignoring Plain Meaning: Individual Relief
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41 Wayne L Rev. 1233, 1248 (1995) (discussing
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Mass Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152-54
(1985), in which he argued that legislative history showed that Congress intended to incorporate
into ERISAthe fiduciary standards of the common law of trusts); see also Hylton, supra note 47,
at 39.
50. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1999).
51. The prudentmanruleis codifiedat ERISA § 404(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)
(1999). This rule provides that a fiduciary shall act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims." 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B) (1999).
52. ERISA §§ 404(a)(1), 406, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1 104(a)(l), 1106 (1999).
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customary at common law.53 Nevertheless, plan fiduciaries must manage all
activities with respect to the plan solely in a manner consistent with the best
interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries."
Under ERISA, plan fiduciaries are obligated to maximize investment
returns. In doing so, they are permitted to take into consideration inherent risks
associated with particular investments.55 Thus, fiduciaries may accept lower
investment returns in exchange for lower risks, or conversely, expose the assets
to higher risks in exchange for the possibility of greater returns. 6 However, an
overriding rule of fiduciary law is that the investor must always adequately
diversify the investment portfolio in order to reduce the risk of investment
losses.57
53. See e.g., Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 n.26 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the flexible ERISAprudent man rule takes a facts and circumstances approach and
does not incorporate the rigorous "prudent expert" standard of the common law); Hylton, supra
note 47, at 39. See also Laurence B. Wohl, Federal Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple
Loyalties, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 43, 53 nn.34-35 (1994); Jay Conison, The Federal Common
Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys, 41 Syracuse L. Rev. 1049, 1135-36 (1990).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1; see also Dan M. McGill & Donald S. Grubbs, Jr.,
Fundamentals of Private Pensions 115-16, 442-44 (6th ed. 1989); see also Hylton, supra note
47 and accompanying text.
55. The Department of Labor takes the position that "economic considerations are the
only ones which can be taken into account in determining which investments are consistent with
ERISA standards." Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May
it be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 Lab. L.J. 387, 392. In its evaluation of investment
choices, the Department of Labor adopts an aggregate analyses which takes the entire
investment portfolio into consideration rather than individual investments. See Paul J. Wessel,
Job Creation for Union Members Through Pension Fund Investment, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 323, 340
(1986).
56. See Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent Risks for Anxious
Workers, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 1175, 1198-1200. The Department of Labor has consistently
rejected the common law approach to evaluating such investment choices with respect to a
particular investment on the bases of using only the relative risk of the single investment. See
Joseph R. Simone & Glenn E. Butash, Statutory Framework, "Language" and Fiduciary
Responsibility Provisions of ERISA, 385 PLI/Tax 7, 27 (1996).
57. See Hylton, supra note 47, at 15, 17-18. Also see ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
1 104(a)(1) (1994) (requiring that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties ... (C) by diversifying
the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses"); see also Hylton, supra
note 47, at 16 (noting that "risk and return are positively correlated"). Diversification is a key
method of reducing risk without reducing aggregate returns from a portfolio of assets. It
exemplifies the old axiom: "Don't put all your eggs in one basket." Essentially, diversification
is spreading investment funds into areas which will react differently to the market, thereby
eliminating risk. See Richard J. Teweles et al., The Stock Market 386-87 (6th ed. 1992).
"Diversification results from the interplay of three elements: (1) the number of different
holdings; (2) the proportions in which different securities [or other assets] are held; and (3) the
extent to which the securities [or other assets] held react in a dissimilar fashion to the same
future contingencies." Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Economic Theory
and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 Pac. L.J. 805, 817 (1985). A perfectly diversified
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Historically, the fiduciary rules have been interpreted to provide greater
protection to participants in defined benefit plans than in defined contribution
plans. 8 One explanation for the different interpretations in the two types of plans
is the level of employer involvement. In a defined benefit plan the employer
determines the level of retirement benefit, who participates, and the manner in
which the plan's assets are invested. 59 By contrast, in a defined contribution plan,
it is often the employee who makes the decisions about participation,
contribution, and asset management. Furthermore, because defined benefit plans
have calculable retirement benefits, plan participants readily can determine
whether a failure to provide promised retirement benefits is attributable to
fiduciary breach. In defined contribution plans, benefits are based upon the
participants' individual account balances and therefore indeterminate in nature.
Thus, absent a showing of imprudent investment choices, a plan participant
would have difficulty demonstrating fiduciary breach when account balances fall
short of the expected retirement benefits.'
B. Fiduciary Breach Under ERISA
ERISA defines a "fiduciary" as one with discretionary authority or
control over pension plan assets, or one who manages pension assets.6,
Accordingly, employers, plan trustees, fund managers, and all other individuals
who provide investment advice for profit are ERISA fiduciaries.' However,
individuals who render professional services to a pension plan in a purely
ministerial capacity are not considered fiduciaries. 63 ERISA does not expressly
portfolio will eliminate nonmarket risk, leaving the assets to fluctuate according to the market.
See id. at 818.
58. See Keville, supra note 4, at 547-48, 552.
59. Subject to the minimum participation standards of IRC § 411.
60. See discussion infra Part ILB.
61. IRC § 4975(e)(3); ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1999).
62. See e.g., Blatt v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1987).
63. For example, actuaries, attorneys, accountants, and plan administration companies
all have been held to be nonfiduciary third parties. See Painters of Philadelphia District Council
No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1149 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that
performance of a standard audit did not make the accounting firm ERISA fiduciaries because
the firm had no discretionary authority over management of the plan assets); Pension Plan of
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. KPMG Peat Marwick. 815 F. Supp. 52- 55 (D.N.H.
1993) (holding that an accounting firm that provides typical auditing services to an ERISA plan
was not an ERISA fiduciary); see Maria Linda Cattafesta, Note, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates:
ANarrow Interpretation of ERISA Precluding Nonfiduciary Liability for Money Damages Under
ERISA, 43 Cath. U.L Rev. 1165, 1170 n. 23 (1994); Anoka Orthopaedic Assoc. v. Lechner, 9 10
F.2d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that ministerial tasks performed for the purpose of
collecting information was not a discretionary act and did not qualify the attorney as an ERISA
fiduciary); New York Teamsters Council Health and Hospital Fund v. Estate of De Pemo, 816
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address or regulate the activity of those who are involved indirectly with the
management of the plan's assets . For example, investment managers are clearly
ERISA fiduciaries, but it is unclear whether investment consultants are
considered fiduciaries.65 Thus, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a
service provider is acting in a fiduciary or ministerial capacity.66
Under ERISA, "[f]iduciaries who breach their fiduciary duties are
personally liable to the plan to make good any resulting losses to the plan."67
ERISA provides that equitable or remedial measures shall be awarded as a court
deems appropriate.6" Historically, the beneficiary of a pension trust could
maintain an equitable suit for damages against not only a fiduciary for breach of
trust, but also against a participating non-fiduciary.69 Thus, even though
fiduciaries and participating non-fiduciaries were subject to different standards
of care, there were remedies available against both, in the event of a breach of
trust.
F. Supp. 138, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); see Cattafesta, supra, at 1170 n.22; Pappas v. Buck
Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that an actuary who performs
usual actuarial services is not an ERISA fiduciary); Fechter v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
798 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (same); see Cattafesta, supra, at 1169-70 nn.20-21;
Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the performance of clerical, mechanical, and ministerial services did not confer discretionary
authority over the plan administrator, and thus, the plan administrator was not an ERISA
fiduciary); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451,454-55 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plan
administrator who performed claims processing services was not an ERISA fiduciary); see
Cattafesta, supra, at 1170 n.23. But see Bouton v. Thompson, 764 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D. Conn.
1991) (holding that an attorney who exercises discretionary control over the management of plan
assets is an ERISA fiduciary).
64. See ERISA § 3(14)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14)(A), 1101-1114 (1999).
65. See Joel Chernoff, Hewitt Decision Challenged; Metzenbaum, Labor Department
Fight High Court Ruling, Pens. & Inv., Jun. 14, 1993, at 229. Case law regarding other service
providers gives the only guidance in this area. See Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1161-63
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that plan's attorney is not ERISA fiduciary); United States v. Coyle,
63 F.3d 1239, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1995) ("by providing medical services to the Fund," AMMA
is a fiduciary under ERISA); see also Andrew T. Kusner, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, and the
ERISA Liability of the Professional Service Provider, 15 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 273, 304-
05 (1994).
66. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993).
67. Michael J. Canan & William D. Mitchell, Employee Fringe and Welfare Benefit
Plans § 16.5 (1994 ed.).
68. See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1998); see Roger C. Siske
et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case and Other Developments,
SB66 A.L.L-A.B.A. 1, 13-36 (1997).
69. Cattafesta, supra note 63, at 1191. The Supreme Court in Mertens defined "equit-
able relief' as "injunction, mandamus, and restitution." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248. Equitable
relief is, in fact, remedies awarded that are not monetary. See Black's Law Dictionary 539 (6th
ed. 1990).
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However, in Mertens v. Hewitt, the Supreme Court interpreted section
502(a)(3) of ERISA as precluding nonfiduciary liability in the event of breach.7"
The Court held that ERISA does not provide monetary relief against
participating nonfiduciary third parties, even when they knowingly participate in
fiduciary breaches.7 TheMertens Court reasoned that because ERISA mandates
specific remedies and "allocates liability for plan-related misdeeds in reasonable
proportion to [the] respective actors' power to control and prevent the misdeeds,"
the provision of monetary relief against service providers who performed services
in the capacity of nonfiduciaries was unavailable.' - The Court explained that
professional service providers lacked the requisite fiduciary control, and became
"liable for damages [ONLY] when they cross the line from advisor to
fiduciary."73
TheMertens Court was concerned that exposing service providers to full
liability for fiduciary breach would result in higher insurance costs for persons
who regularly provide advisory services to ERISA plans.74 To do so, they feared,
ultimately would increase the costs for ERISA plans. In other words, the Court
believed that money that otherwise would be used for retirement benefits would
be used to pay for indemnification against potential litigation. Thus, the Mertens
Court preferred to limit the remedies against service providers to court
injunctions, or restitution of fees, rather than to hold them liable for restoring
losses resulting from their participation in fiduciary breaches."
Interestingly, the common law of trusts accords participants and their
beneficiaries a cause of action for monetary damages against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participated in fiduciary breaches.76 Thus, under pre-ERISA trust law,
wealthy nonfiduciaries were discouraged from participating in fiduciary breaches
fearing that they could be alternative financial resources to subsidize lost
retirement benefits. For this reason, many commentators characterize the Court's
restrictive interpretation of ERISA's fiduciary law in the Mertens decision as
regressive.77
70. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 262.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Chernoff, supra note 65, at 3 (discussing the Mertens opinion).
75. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262.
76. See Kusner, supra note 65, at 280-81 (discussing how some circuits relied on pre-
ERISA trust law to reach an interpretation of ERISA §502(a) different than the Supreme Court
did in Mertens).
77. See, e.g., Kusner, supra note 65; Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or
Congressional Compromise?, 81 Iowa L Rev. 1 (1995); Gregory A. Hewett, Should Non-
Fiduciaries Who Knowingly Participate in a Fiduciary Breach Be Liable for Damages Under
ERISA?, 71 Wash U. LQ. 773 (1993). The dissent in Mertens argued that both equitable and
legal remedies were available under the common law of trusts to ensure that beneficiaries
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The Court's holding that nonfiduciary service providers are immune
from fiduciary liability is potentially more devastating to defined contribution
plan participants than to defined benefit plan participants. In defined benefit
plans, if the remedies against third party non-fiduciaries are inadequate, the
minimum retirement benefit is, nevertheless, guaranteed by the employer and the
PBGC.78 Participants, therefore, do not face the risk of insufficient asset
accumulation as a result of third party involvement in fiduciary breaches. Thus,
diverting pension assets to provide a broader range of remedies against
nonfiduciaries in defined benefit plans could be considered unnecessary or
inefficient. Consequently, the Supreme Court's reluctance to have pension assets
diverted for service provider indemnification can be understood in the defined
benefit plan context.
In contrast, however, because there is neither employer liability nor
PBGC protection in defined contribution plans, defined contribution plan
participants have no protection against shortfalls. Therefore, if a defined
contribution plan in which the fiduciary is unable to respond, terminates with
insufficient asset accumulation due to third party fiduciary breach, and the
remedies against the third party are inadequate to fully restore the lost benefits,
the plan participants will bear the brunt of the loss.79 Defined contribution plan
participants are, thus, exposed to much greater risks when service providers
contribute to plan losses than defined benefit plan participants. Accordingly, the
use of retirement funds to indemnify service providers in connection with a
broadening of the remedies against third parties, could be reasonably considered
an efficient use of defined contribution plan assets, because plan participants
received complete relief. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264-66. Moreover, the dissent concluded that
the phrase "appropriate equitable relief' used in ERISA § 502(a)(3) implicitly includes all
remedies available under equity for breaches which include monetary damages against both
fiduciaries and nonfiduciaries alike. Id. at 266-67. The dissent's interpretation would give plan
participants and their beneficiaries the same protection under ERISA that they would have had
before the enactment of ERISA. See id. Mertens states in dicta that there is no cause of action
against a nonfiduciary for knowingly participating in a fiduciary's breach of duty under ERISA.
See Remedies: Seventh Circuit Finds No Claim Against Nonfiduciary, Cites Mertens, 21 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1675, 1675 (Aug. 29, 1994). Chief Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit
followed this "considered dictum" while holding that there is no cause of action against a
nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in a fiduciary's breach of duty under ERISA. Reich v.
Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1994). The First Circuit has also
followed Mertens's lead in holding that equitable remedies are not available against
nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty. See Reich v. Rowe,
20 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1994).
78. See infra Part ILA.
79. If a retirement plan is not covered by Title I of ERISA, the participant will have
remedies available under state law, including money damages and injunctive relief. See Canan,
supra note 30, at § 21.2, at 1024-25.
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otherwise have inadequate protection.80 Thus, the Mertens holding is less
understandable in the defined contribution plan context, where participants are
exposed to greater risks of loss when third parties make investment decisions, or
are involved in the management of plan assets."'
C. The Fiduciary Rules and Participant Directed Plans
Although employers who sponsor defined contribution plans are not
required to allow participants to make individual participation and investment
decisions, many employers recognize that giving flexibility enables employees to
customize their retirement programs to accommodate specific saving objectives
and risk tolerances. 2 Thus, growth in the defined contribution plan area has been
driven largely by the establishment of participant directed plans." Participant
directed plans cover approximately 25 million employees, and represent the
fastest growing component of the private sector retirement system.8s In
participant directed plans, employees decide not only whether to participate, and
the level of compensation to be contributed to the plan by the employer on their
80. Immediately after Mertens was decided, the Department of Labor sought to
persuade Congress to amend ERISA to assign fiduciary responsibility to anyone directly or
indirectly involved in the management of pension assets. The Senate Labor Committee drafted
an amendment to ERISA that explicitly made service providers liable for monetary damages if
they "knowingly participate[d]" in fiduciary breaches. Chernoff, supra note 65, at 1. Senator
Howard Metzenbaum, with input from the Department of Labor, drafted the amendment to
reverse the Supreme Court's Mertens decision. See Chernoff, supra note 65. at 2. The
amendment was later defeated. Id.
81. See infra Part ILC.
82. Employees often are asked to decide whether they will participate in the plan,
how much to contribute to the plan from current compensation, how their funds should be
invested within choices offered by the employer, and finally, whether to roll over lump sum
distributions received from the plans on termination of employment. See Keville, supra note 4,
at 549-51. Interestingly, the reason most employers allow participants to make these decisions
is a general misconception about ERISA. Basically, employers who sponsor qualified plans are
convinced that ERISA § 404(c) protects them from any potential liability arising out of the
investment returns experienced in a participant's account if they only transferred investment
responsibility for the account to the participant. See Jeffrey M. Miller, Employer-Directed Plans
May Be the Answer, Pension Mgmt., Nov. 1994, at 30.
83. Participant directed plans are typically 401 (k) plans; however, other defined con-
tribution plans also may give participants the responsibility of choosing how the plan assets are
to be invested. In addition to the self-directed feature, 401(k) plans often require participants
to make numerous other decisions about their retirement security.
84. Marlene Givant Star, Participants in a Quandry About Plan Options, Pens. & Inv.,
Oct. 17, 1994, at 19. The number of participant directed 401(k) plans has grown rapidly.
Participation in such plans increased by approximately 45% from 1983 to 1993, attributable in
large part to the creation of new retirement plans by small businesses. See Canan, supra note
30, at §16.3, at 788.
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behalves, but also the manner in which their accounts are to be invested. 5 In
such plans, the individual decisions made by plan participants ultimately
determine the adequacy of the retirement benefit.
Notwithstanding the significance of the investment decisions, however,
ERISA currently imposes no additional notification or education requirements
on employers who sponsor participant directed plans. ERISA's general fiduciary
standards govern the plan's notification and investment practices. Thus,
participant directed plans raise an additional question about the adequacy of
ERISA's fiduciary rules. Is it appropriate to allow employers to shift the
responsibility of making critical investment decisions to plan participants, who
typically lack professional financial training? 6 Section 404(c) safe harbor plans
(discussed below) raise even more concerns regarding the adequacy of ERISA's
fiduciary rules because under such plans, the employer and other plan fiduciaries
are almost completely insulated from fiduciary liability for the poor investment
decisions made by plan participants.
1. Investment Practices and Participant Directed Plans.-In employer
directed plans, a plan administrator or an investment professional typically
controls the plan investments.8 7 The investment manager is required to allocate
investments in a manner that offers protection against inflation, market
fluctuations, and unfavorable market performance.88 In participant directed
plans, the same investment strategy is desirable, but generally not utilized
because employees often have not had sufficient investment training to achieve
this result.89
The modem portfolio theory of investment explains that an adequately
diversified portfolio should include an appropriate balance of stocks, bonds, and
stable valued funds.90 However, inexperienced participants generally fail to
adequately diversify their retirement accounts, investing disproportionately in
stable value funds.91 Because a balanced investment portfolio provides a better
85. The investment choice is made among the investment options offered by the
employer.
86. See Mary Rowland, Taking the Power of the 401 (k), and Handing it to Someone
Else, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1995, at F5 (stating that some plan participants have recognized
their own inadequacies regarding investment management and have turned their retirement
accounts over to outside stockbrokers).
87. See Keville, supra note 4, at 543-44.
88. Diversification is Key to Success of Section 401(k) Investments, ASPA Told, 17
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1243 (July 16, 1990) [hereinafter Diversification].
89. Insufficient financial training has been cited most frequently as the explanation
for why participants use overly conservative investment strategies. Id. at 1243.
90. See J. Michael McGowan, Watching Your Basket: Keys to Nurturing a Successful
Investment Portfolio, 78 A.B.A. J. 97 (Nov. 1992).
91. Diversification, supra note 88, at 1243.
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relationship between return and risk, the failure to adequately diversify
investment portfolios adversely affects retirement income security. A high
concentration of stable value, low-yield investments generally produces
insufficient investment income over one's working life to provide financial
security for the retirement years.92 Consequently, a participant who
disproportionately invests in stable valued instruments would have to save
greater amounts to be in the same position at retirement as a participant who
sufficiently diversified their investment portfolio.93
Not only are inexperienced investors likely to inadequately diversify their
retirement portfolios, but they also are less likely to recognize the financial
indicators on which investment professionals rely to know when to transfer funds
from one investment to another.' Therefore, inexperienced investors may fail to
make appropriate changes when such transactions are warranted. Under other
circumstances, inexperienced investors may act too hastily.9" For example,
during market down-swings, undisciplined investors may abandon high-risk,
high-return investments too quickly, notwithstanding conventional wisdom that
these investments perform best over the long-run.
If inexperienced participants do not, or cannot, make good investment
decisions, they will have insufficient accumulation when they retire. Younger
employees are particularly vulnerable to less than optimal investment practices
because the compounding of their returns will occur over longer periods of time.
Thus, the success or failure of participant-directed plans hinges on the proper
education and notification of plan participants in areas of asset allocation,
diversification, and risk return.97
92. Overly conservative investment strategy is problematic for two other reasons:
First, inflation, although averaging only 4% over the last decade, is a potential threat to the
purchasing power of retirement income. Second, as life expectancies continue to increase, assets
that participants have accumulated in their defined contribution plan accounts vill need to
stretch farther. Alexander Sussman, The Investment Horizon: How Can Employers Assure
Adequate Retiree Benefits in the Coming Years?, Comp. & Ben. Rev., Jan. 1, 1996, at 73.
93. See Regina T. Jefferson, The American Dream Savings Account: Is it a Dream or
a Nightmare?, Taxing America 261 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
94. See Keville, supra note 4, at 545-46 (noting that "the majority of self-directed
pension plan investors transferred funds to the stock market after it reached its high in 1987, and
bailed out after the market crashed soon thereafter").
95. Participants in 401(k) plans are active traders, contrary to popular belief. These
investors may panic during market fluctuations, selling too quickly, which ultimately could
threaten their financial security. See Vanessa O'Connell, Market Bumps Rattle Nerves at
401(k)s, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1996, at Cl.
96. SeeJudyGreenwald, Investment Education Raises Employer Liability Questions:
When Does Information Become Advice?, Bus. Ins., Oct. 31, 1994, at 2,98.
97. See James E. Graham, Does 404(c) Provide More Questions Than Answers?,
Pension World (July 1994) at p. 48.
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2. The Education and Notification Requirement in Participant Directed
Plans.-ERISA's mandate of "fiduciary responsibility" for plan trustees,
investment managers, and other persons who control pension plans, makes all
plan fiduciaries ultimately responsible for asset performance in retirement
plans.98 Thus, in participant directed plans, the employer remains liable as an
ERISA fiduciary, although the participant makes the investment choices.99
Consequently, it is possible for the participant who loses money as a result of
inadequate investment diversification to bring a cause of action against the
employer, on the grounds that the availability of the transaction implied approval
of the investment choice. Alternatively, a participant could argue that the
employer should have recognized a problem with the investment decision, and
overruled the allocation. Although a participant would have tremendous difficulty
meeting the burden of proof for such allegations, the employer or plan
fiduciaries, nevertheless, would be liable for the investment losses if the
participant were successful." °
To minimize their potential liability for poor investment decisions made
by plan participants, many employers have established education programs.'
Providing investment education presents a catch twenty-two for the employer,
however. On the one hand, employers can be held liable if they do not provide
sufficient investment information to enable plan participants to make sound
investment decisions. On the other, they can be held liable for losses as plan
98. See Munnell, supra note 11, at 137; see also supra Part Ul.B. There is an exception
for § 404(c) plans in which the plan fiduciaries are not responsible for the investment decisions
made by plan participants. See infra Part ll.C.3.
99. This is true even in § 404(c) plans in which the employer's liability is
significantly minimized. See infra Part Il.C.3.
100. In participant directed defined contribution plans the fiduciary standards would
most likely be applied less strictly than in other types of defined contribution plans. Fiduciaries
of such plans are apparently obligated to exercise only procedural prudence regarding
investment decisions. Therefore, successful participant claims regarding poor investment
performance are essentially eliminated in participant directed accounts. To establish fiduciary
breach or mismanagement in a participant directed plan, participants would be limited to
showing either that they were not advised properly, that there were not broad enough investment
choices, or that there were inappropriate investment alternatives. Miller, supra note 82, at 30.
For a discussion of participant directed plans, see supra, Part IKC. 1.
101. See Thomas R. Hoecker &Nancy K. Campbell, Participant Directed Investment
Plans-Problems and Solutions, Q245 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 211 (1996); see also EBRI Releases Report
on Participant Education for Improved Retirement Savings, 95 Tax Notes Today 86-51 (May 3,
1995) [hereinafter EBRI Releases]. A survey by EBRI and Matthew Greenwald and Associates
indicated that 73% of 401(k) participants received some type of educational material from their
employer. Id. Among the 73% that received the material, 33% increased the amount of their
contribution and 44% changed the allocation of their money. Id.
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fiduciaries if the information is considered investment advice, and later proves
to be incorrect.102
The Department of Labor Regulations explain that "investment advice"
consists of recommendations pertaining to property value; "investment
information" consists of mere communication that is general in nature.'
03
Accordingly, providing a list of investment vehicles and instructions about the
investment selection process is likely to be considered mere communication.
Whereas, specific recommendations about particular investments are likely to
constitute investment advice."°
Until recently, employers were counseled that providing bad investment
advice was a greater risk than providing insufficient investment information."
In other words, employers were more exposed to litigation when they established
education programs than when they allowed participants to make their investment
decisions without the benefit of financial training."os Because employers are
typically unwilling to assume a risk of greater exposure to potential liability, it
102. See Mary Rowland, Educate-or Litigate: Educating Pension Plan Participants,
Inst. Inv., March 1, 1995, at 87. If the information is considered investment advice, those
providing the information, e.g., employers, plan sponsors, service providers, would be deemed
fiduciaries, subject to liability under ERISA. See Frederick C. Kneip, Section 404(c): Basic
Principles, 397 PLI/Tax 43 (1997); See also Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee
Benefits: A Summary of Current Cases and Other Developments. SB66 A.LL-A.B.A. 1, 78-79
(1997).
103. The Department of Labor has determined that "[a]n investment advisor who
suggests investment alternatives for a pension plan has a definite fiduciary duty to select
alternatives prudently." Keville, supra note 4, at 551-52. Keville also notes that "an investment
advisor who is hired by an employer to provide investment instructions to employees is a
fiduciary under the terms of ERISA if the advisor is compensated for services rendered." Id.
104. See Keville, supra note 4, at 551-52. However, any individual giving investment
information to plan participants may be considered a fiduciary if it reasonable for the participant
to consider the information investment advice and if the participant acts accordingly to her
detriment. Jack W. Murphy, Associate Director and ChiefCounsel of the Division of Investment
Management at the SEC stated that an employee sponsor providing information would not be
considered to be giving advice unless it held itself out as providing advice or received additional
compensation from employees or third parties for the advice. See Division of Investment
Management the Year in Review: Regulation of Investment Companies, Investment Advisors
and Public Utility Holding Companies in 1996, 979 PII/Corp 7, 680 (Feb.-Mar. 1997).
105. See Rowland, supra note 102, at 87. See also Jeffrey M. Miller, The Difference
Between Education and Advice, Pension Mgmt., Feb. 1995, at 34. If plan sponsors teach
participants about investment performance in achieving long-term retirement goals, the sponsor
will not be considered a fiduciary. Id. However, if the sponsor creates programs which provide
the basis for participants' investment decisions, plan sponsors may be regarded as fiduciaries
which exposes them to potential liability. Id. In this situation, sponsors will have crossed the
line between providing investment information and advice. Id.
106. See Rowland, supra note 102, at 87; see also Miller, supra note 105, at 30 (not-
ing that in the 1980's, employers thought they could avoid liability altogether by transferring
the investment responsibility to plan participants).
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is not surprising that many employers have not provided adequate investment
education to their employees." 7 As a result, employees participating in
participant-directed plans are often left on their own to obtain the education and
training necessary to successfully manage their retirement savings.
The significance of the distinction between investment advice and
investment information is another reason the Mertens decisions is more troubling
for certain defined contribution plan participants than for defined benefit plan
participants. In participant-directed defined contribution plans, unsophisticated
investors unable to distinguish between investment advice and investment
information may suffer unfortunate consequences as a result of
misunderstandings. If an investment broker aggressively markets alternative
investments under the rubric of investment information, inexperienced plan
participants could interpret the broker's comments as specific recommendations,
rather than general information. Believing that they have received investment
advice, participants may rely on the communication and make decisions that
adversely affect the build-up of their accounts. Under Mertens, money damages
would be unavailable to the plan participants in this situation, even if the broker
had adequate assets to restore plan losses. 08 Thus, the participants ultimately
would receive smaller retirement benefits than expected.'"
3. Section 404(c) Plans.-Another method of minimizing liability for
poor investment performance is for the employer to adopt a section 404(c)
plan.' 0 An employer's exposure to fiduciary liability is substantially reduced if
107. See Rowland, supra note 102, at 87. Recent numbers suggest that there has been
an increase in education programs offered by employers. However, many employers make such
programs available because it is important for them to encourage low and middle income
employees to participate in elective contribution plan. See EBRI Databook, supra note 19.
However, with the introduction of the new safe harbor rules for nondiscrimination in 401(k)
plans many employers may discontinue these programs.
108. See supra Part ILB. The only chance for the participant to receive money
damages is for her to demonstrate that she reasonably interpreted the comments as investment
advice. An investment advisor who directs participant investment selections for a pension plan
has a fiduciary duty to select alternatives prudently. See Keville, supra note 4, at 548-52.
109. A cause of action may be available under common law, however. See infra Part
I.A.
110. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1999). This section provides:
(c)(1) In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts
and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over assets in his
account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in
his account (as determined under regulations of the Secretary)-
(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by
reason of such exercise, and
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for
any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant's
[VoL 4:9
Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans
the plan complies with the rules and regulations of section 404(c), "safe harbor"
plans."' These rules require the employer to give a broad range of investment
options, and reasonable instructions regarding the significance of the options."
Unlike traditional participant directed plans in which plan fiduciaries
retain some obligation to make sure that the plan assets are protected against
losses, section 404(c)safe harbor plans essentially shield the employer and other
plan fiduciaries from any liability. 3 Regardless of how plan participants allocate
or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Id. Section 404(c) of ERISA is elective and applies only to defined contribution plans, such as
401(k) plans, where participants control the investment of their assets. Id.
111. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2000). The § 404(c) regulations were issued in
October of 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 46932 (1992). The regulations define an ERISA § 404(c) plan
as, generally, a defined contribution plan that provides participants with the opportunity to
"exercise control over assets" in their accounts and provides the participant with "an opportunity
to choose from a broad range of investment alternatives." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b)(l)(i). (ii)
(2000). See also Canan, supra note 30, at §16.3, at 788-89. However, § 404(c) relief is not
available in transactions where a plan fiduciary has exercised improper influence or concealment
of material nonpublic facts known by the fiduciary, or takes instructions from a participant that
is known by the fiduciary to be legally incompetent. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(c)(2) (2000).
112. See Canan supra note 30, at § 16.3, at 791-93. A broad range of investment
alternatives means:
(I) A plan offers a broad range of investment alternatives only if the available
investment alternatives are sufficient to provide the participant or beneficiary with a
reasonable opportunity to:
(A) Materially affect the potential return on amounts in his individual
account with respect to which he is permitted to exercise control and the
degree of risk to which such amounts are subject;
(B) Choose from at least three investment alternatives:
(1) Each of which is diversified;
(2) Each of which has materially different risk and
return characteristics;
(3) Which in the aggregate enables the participant or
beneficiary by choosing among them to achieve a
portfolio with aggregate risk and return characteristics
at any point within the range normally appropriate for
the participant or beneficiary; and
(4) Each of which when combined with investments in
the other alternatives tends to minimize through
diversification the overall risk of a participant's or
beneficiarys portfolio;
(C) Diversify the investment of that portion of his individual account with
respect to which he is permitted to exercise control so as to minimize the
risk of large losses....
29 C.F.R § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (2000).
113. See Investments: Pension Plan Participants Need Education on Investments,
Group Told, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 775 (Apr. 18, 1994). However, § 404(c)compliance
does not shield the employer from all fiduciary liability. Plan fiduciaries are still accountable
for making certain that the investment options offered are sound and the investment managers
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their assets in such plans, plan fiduciaries are not liable for any losses that result
from poor investment returns. 114 These plans, therefore, place the entire risk of
accumulating insufficient assets from poor investment decisions on the
participantsY
5
As is the case in traditional participant directed plans, the employer who
sponsors a section 404(c) safe harbor plan has no obligation to assist participants
in making their investment decisions. Furthermore, as discussed above, the
employer is discouraged from doing so because such assistance could trigger
fiduciary liability in plans that are otherwise in compliance with section
404(c).' 1 6 Therefore, participants in safe harbor plans have little or no recourse
against employers, administrators, or service providers for investment losses." 7
They are barred from claiming that the employer either should have recognized
a problem, or provided different investment options." 8 In traditional participant
directed plans, these allegations might be successful on the grounds that a failure
to diversify the participant's account violates ERISA's prudence and
diversification rule. 19
D. Pension Policy and Participant Directed Plans
Employers prefer participant directed plans because they are more
convenient and less costly to maintain than other plans, and some employers
establish these plans in efforts to minimize their liability for investment
decisions. 2° Employees typically prefer participant-directed plans because they
selected are competent. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550, 404c-1(a)(2) (2000). See also Rowland, supra
note 102, at 87-88; Keville, supra note 4, at 549.
114. See Frederick C. Kneip, Section 404(c): Basic Principles, 397 PLI/Tax 43,46-48
(May 1997).
115. See Canan, supra note 30, at § 16.3, at 793; see also Greenwald, supra note 96,
at WL p. 2-3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(1), (2) (2000).
116. See also supra Part II.C.2; Keville, supra note 4, at 551-52.
117. See ERISA § 404(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (1999) (providing that a
fiduciary is not liable for a loss resulting from the exercise of control by a participant or
beneficiary); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2000) (providing that when independent control
over the assets is exercised by a participant or beneficiary, the fiduciary is not responsible for
any loss that is the direct and necessary result). However, there remains some liability for the
employer. See Kneip, supra note 114, at 69-70.
118. See Hoecker & Campbell, supra note 101, at 213; but see 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (d)(2)(ii)(A)-(E) (2000) (providing that § 404(c)'s limit on fiduciary liability will
not be available if, for example, the participant's decision would violate provisions in the plan
documents).
119. See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 56, at 1213; Patricia Wick Hatamyar, See
No Evil? The Role of the Directed Trustee Under ERISA, 64 Tenn L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1996); see
also supra Part l.A.
120. See supra Part I.B.
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believe that the plan's flexibility can provide greater long term rewards, if they
make wise investment decisions. '2 However, it is not uncommon for plan
participants to have inflated opinions about their investment expertise." Thus,
rather than increasing their retirement income security, participant directed plans,
in reality, may decrease the retirement income security of those who are
inexperienced in financial investment.
This is particularly true as the emergence of new products and services
makes investment decision making more difficult. For example, some plans allow
participants to execute trades on a daily, rather than monthly basis." Other
plans provide broad ranges of options that include the entire universe of publicly
traded stock. 24 Expansive measures such as these are increasingly offered,
although the complexity of the limited investment options previously available
to plan participants was well beyond the understanding of the average investor.'
The popularity of participant directed plans does not necessarily stem
from the fact that they are the best way to maximize retirement income security,
however. Rather their popularity stems from the fact that they are what both
employers and employees seemingly prefer.2 6 Despite their overwhelming popu-
larity, participant directed plans present a very difficult trade-off. " Employees
are given greater flexibility and autonomy in making investment decisions, but
they are also exposed to greater risks of investment losses. Moreover, as
employers increasingly establish participant directed plans, undoubtedly more of
them will turn to safe harbor plans that provide even less protection for plan
participants, in order to avoid unwanted exposure to fiduciary liability.'
121. See Star, supra note 84, at 19.
122. Two thirds of participants surveyed in a study conducted by Buck Consultants
of New York and Phoenix Hecht of the Research Triangle in North Carolina, preferred to
manage their own assets. See Star, supra note 84, at 19; Jan M. Rosen, Self-Directed Retirement
Plans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1990, at Al.
123. See Brian E. Schaefer, The Trouble With Daily Switching for 401(k)s. Pens. &
Inv., March 6, 1995, at 12; see also Star, supra note 84. at 19. When plans allow fund switches
on a daily basis, it may cause participants to play the market, producing inferior results in the
long run.
124. See Schaefer, supra note 123, at 12.
125. See Star, supra note 84, at 19 (explaining that those who are significantly affect-
ed by the complexity are those under age 30, over age 55, and the poor).
126. See supra Part LB.
127. The combination of imprudent investment allocation and the elimination of the
employer responsibility for the participant's investment decisions is likely to result in benefits
which fall short of the expected retirement income replacement goal for some participants. See
Donald Faller, Give 401(k) Participants Customized Assistance, Nat'l.Underwriter Life &
Health Fin. Serv. Ed. 22 (May 15, 1995). See also supra Part ILC.I.
128. The Greenwich Associates studies indicate that 29% of companies with defined
contribution plans are planning to comply with the safe harbor rules of § 404(e) in the near
future. See supra Part ILC.3. The Department of Labor regulations on participant investments
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Notwithstanding the shortcomings of participant directed plans, it would
nevertheless be difficult, and perhaps counter productive, to eliminate them as
retirement savings options, because of their tremendous appeal to employees and
employers alike. In the absence of participant directed plans, some employers
may choose not to establish plans, and some employees may choose not to
participate. Even so, the self-help approach adopted by participant directed plans
is inconsistent with ERISA's goal of increasing the retirement income security
of plan participants. To provide the level of retirement income security
envisioned by ERISA as originally drafted, there should be some residual
fiduciary responsibility imposed on employers who sponsor participant directed
plans. An education and notification requirement should also be imposed on
sponsors of such plans. These changes would ensure that plan participants are
qualified to make prudent investment decisions with regard to their retirement
savings, and can appreciate the significance of the risk of shortages when they
do not. 129
E. Residual Liability and a Notification and Education Requirement
The private retirement system is employment based.'30 Therefore, it is
only through employment relationships that such benefits are made available.
One of the rationales for the employment based characteristic of the private
pension program is that there are comparative advantages from saving in
employer sponsored plans as opposed to personal savings arrangements. ' 3' First,
saving for retirement requires financial investment expertise. Because it is more
likely that the employer is in a better position to retain financial experts than the
employees, participants typically receive greater returns inside a plan than
outside. 32 Second, an employer who invests large amounts can benefit from
economies of scale. As a result, investment returns should be higher, and
administrative costs should be lower, inside an employer sponsored plan.'33
under § 404(c) of ERISA were issued in October 1992 and took effect January 1, 1994. See
Most Firms Comply with Section 404(c) Rules, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1100 (June 6,
1994).
129. See supra Part II.C.2.
130. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 32.
13 1. See Munnell, supra note 11 at 54; see also Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at
32.
132. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 32.
133. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 32-33. Although not discussed in this
article, wider participation is another reason the private pension system is employer based. In
other words, another rationale for the tax favorable treatment of qualified plans is that
retirement benefits for rank and file employees will exist only if Congress provides tax
incentives that will induce higher paid employees to support the establishment of employer
sponsored retirement savings plans. Id. at 200-03 (citing Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for
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Another characteristic of the private pension system is that it is
voluntary. Employers are encouraged to establish qualified plans with substantial
tax benefits." 4 The basic tax advantage is tax deferral. Amounts contributed to
qualified plans by employers are not taxed to the employee when they are made.
Also the earnings on the contributions accumulate tax-free, and the employee is
not taxed on the amounts in the plan until they are distributed.'35 In connection
with the favorable tax treatment of pension plans, the Treasury forgoes large
amounts of tax revenue each year.
36
Because the preferential tax treatment of retirement benefits reduces the
employee's current taxable income, it is possible for the employer to deliver a
dollar of retirement income at a lower cost than it could deliver a dollar of
current wages to its employees. 37 Accordingly, an employer is able to reduce
Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 Va. L Rev. 419,
426-33) (1984).
134. "Qualified plans provide the most tax effective way of delivering retirement
income, because (i) the employer receives a current tax deduction for contributions to a trust.
(ii) the trust pays no tax on its investment income, and (iii) the employee pays no tax until he
receives a distribution from the trust." Max J. Schwartz& Lora S. Collins, Securing the Promise
to Pay Funding of Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation, 328 PLI/Tax 275,279 (July-August,
1992); see also Frank P. Vanderploeg, Role-Playing Under ERISA The Company as"Employer"
and "Fiduciary," 9 DePaul Bus. LJ. 259, 272 n.43 (1997).
135. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 156.
136. The cost to the Treasury is in the form of forgone revenue. The annual cost of
the private retirement program is an estimated $64 billion. See EBRI Databook, supra note 19,
at 19-23, thl. 2-5. The tax expenditure estimates for pensions are calculated on a cash flow
basis. This method of calculation has the effect of placing no value on the pension promise
itself, only on the advanced funding of the promise. See EBRL Pension Tax Expenditures: Art
They Worth the Cost?, Feb. 1993, #134.
137. See IRC § 402(a)(1). An employee may be willing to accept a lesser-valued plan
contribution in exchange for current compensation, e.g., a $4,500 plan contribution in place of
$5,000 in current compensation, because the $4,500 is tax free. See Mary Oppenheimer, From
Meldrum to Indopco: Should Qualified Plan Professional Fees Be Capitalized?. 40 Wayne L
Rev. 109, 131-132 (1993) (citing Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement
Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 Va. L Rev. 419,432 (1984)); Langbein
& Wolk, supra note 5, at 149 (discussing the tax treatment of qualified plans). A related but
different issue is the extent to which current wages are reduced in connection with expected
retirement benefits, i.e., higher pensions lead to lower wages. While no one would deny that the
retirement income contribution is a part of an employee's wage package, the extent to which
workers wages are effected by their expected retirement incomes is difficult to determine. See
Munnell, supra note 11, at 2. One view says the plan participants give up wages equal to the
value of the benefits that they accrue each year. See Edward Thomas Veal & Edward R.
Mackiewicz, Pension Plan Terminations 204 (1989). Another view is that of the "implicit
contract" hypothesis. This view says that an employee's wages are reduced equal to the level
payment needed to fund the pension that is expected to be received if the plan continues
indefinitely and the participant has a normal working life time with the employer. For example,
if an employee expects to be employed for 30 years, and the anticipated normal retirement
benefit under the plan is $300 per month, and the first year's amortization of this benefit would
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current compensation by more than the actual amount of contributions made to
the plan. Arguably, the economic benefits enjoyed by employers are justifiable
only if participants are in fact better off being covered by an employer sponsored
arrangement than they otherwise would be.
Although sponsors of participant directed and employer directed plans
enjoy equal tax benefits, participants of the plans are not accorded the same
nontax advantages. In participant directed plans, participants, not the employer,
make the investment decisions. Thus, the participants do not benefit from the
employer's investment programs, or financial guidance. Furthermore, any
advantages derived from economies of scale are diminished, if the participants
fail to make prudent investment decisions. Therefore, another reason to impose
residual liability on sponsors of participant directed plans is to justify the
economic benefits they receive, as well as to justify the overall cost of the
retirement savings program.13
8
The education requirement should also mandate a variety of educational
mediums. There is substantial evidence showing that printed communication
generally is ineffective in aiding the investment education of plan participants
because employees either do not understand written materials, or disregard
them. 39 Thus, the requirement should specifically include a complement of
written materials, seminars, and financial planning software on retirement asset
management. Additionally, the education provided should be responsive to the
investment needs of different groups of participants. For example, there should
be age specific information.'40
Finally, an education requirement should address the timing and
frequency of retirement planning information. Presently, some employers offer
one-time retirement planning sessions to older employees who are approaching
retirement, but do not provide similar sessions for younger workers.'41 However,
because the assets of younger workers are invested over longer periods of time,
they are more likely to suffer from imprudent investment strategies than older
be approximately $270. Thus, the participant's current wages would be reduced by that amount
to fund the expected retirement benefit. Id. at 204.
138. See Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the Twenty-First Century:
Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 495, 512 (1993); see also
Jefferson, supra note 93, at 253 (stating that all taxpayers pay the subsidy bypaying "higher tax
rates on the portions of their [retirement] incomes that do not enjoy special tax treatment").
139. See generally Ed Peratta, 401(k) Communication That Works, Pens. Mgmt.,
Dec. 1995, at 32; EBRI Releases Report on Participant Education for Improved Retirement
Savings, 95 Tax Notes Today 86-51 (May 3, 1995).
140. Investment horizons will vary with age and will therefore affect investing
strategies. Because of this, employer-provided information will need to address different issues
with various groups. See Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple
Loyalties, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev.43, 92 (1994); Keville, supra note 4, at 544.
141. See Keville, supra note 4, at 544.
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employees.'42 Therefore, it would be important for the education requirement to
require financial training for all workers throughout their working lives.
The education requirement would not only enable participants to make
better investment decisions, but also would eliminate the catch twenty-two that
employers currently face regarding investment advice and investment
information. 43 The content, frequency, and medium of all communication
regarding investment would be regulated. All participants would receive the same
education. It would therefore no longer be necessary to use a cumbersome facts
and circumstances analysis to classify communications between employers and
employees as either advice or information. More importantly, however, plan
participants would be better able to make prudent investment decisions and
appreciate the future value of their expected retirement income in order to
determine whether it is necessary for them to supplement their expected
retirement benefits with increased personal savings.'44
F. Enforcement of a Notification and Education Requirement
Under a properly implemented notification and education requirement,
when an employer failed to comply, fiduciary liability for the resulting losses
would be reinstated. Although determining the actual loss in a defined
contribution plan is not a straightforward calculation, the loss could be
determined using any one of several approaches. For example, the actual loss
could be determined by the excess of either the average rate of return for
Treasury Bills, or the average rate of return for a specified portfolio mix, over
the actual rate of return earned by the account. 4 '
After determining the loss, an excise tax should be imposed on the
employer. The excise tax could be a flat rate excise tax designed to recoup an
account holder's lost investment build-up. Alternatively, like the section 4971 tax
for underfunding, the flat rate excise tax could be imposed at a rate high enough
to both recoup asset losses, and discourage noncompliance. Another option is for
the excise tax to be calculated on a case-by-case basis, using particular facts and
circumstances to measure the loss, exactly. 46 Regardless of how the tax is
determined or structured, however, under no circumstances should employers
who completely insulate themselves from liability for imprudent investment
142. Id. Poor returns compounded over the working life of a young employee result
in greater gaps between expected and actual benefits than poor returns compounded only briefly
as for older employees. Id.; cf. Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 79.
143. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
144. See Dallas Salisbury, ERISA's Success and the Vista for the Future, Pens. &
Inv., Aug. 22, 1994, at 14.
145. See discussion infra Part IE. 1.
146. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 36.
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decisions enjoy the same level of tax benefits as sponsors who retain liability
when such losses occur.
L. INSURANCE PROTECTION AGAINST MARKET FLUCTUATIONS
A. The Gap In Insurance Protection
The goal of ERISA was not only to protect participants from fiduciary
misconduct and asset mismanagement, but also to protect plan participants from
pension default. '47 Thus, in addition to establishing higher fiduciary standards for
managers of employee benefits, as part of ERISA Congress also established a
federal insurance program administered by the PBGC to protect participants
from benefit loss due to plan failure.148
Under the pension insurance program the PBGC provides substantial
protection of defined benefit plan accruals, but not of defined contribution
plans.' 49 Section 3(34) of ERISA specifically provides that PBGC protection is
not available to individual account plans. 5 ' This section defines individual
account plans as plans in which the level of benefit for each employee fluctuates
depending on the experience of the account. Because the retirement benefit in
defined contribution plans is dependent upon actual contributions made to an
account and the investment performance of each separate account, all defined
contribution plans are excluded from ERISA's insurance program.' 5'
When ERISA was established in 1974, Congress could not have
anticipated the recent shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans. 52 Thus, the failure to provide insurance protection for defined contribution
plans may have been appropriate when the number of defined contribution plans
was not expected to rise. However, because thousands of plan participants now
rely upon defined contribution plans as their primary retirement savings vehicles,
the financial security of many future retirees will depend on how successful
defined contribution plans are in accumulating, and delivering their expected
retirement benefits. Therefore, notwithstanding the historical explanation for the
absence of insurance protection for defined contribution plans, the gap in
insurance protection is no longer appropriate or justifiable. Insuring a minimum
investment return in retirement savings plans is not only a feasible idea, but what
147. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 92-93.
148. See McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 55.
149. See Edward R. Mackiewicz, Pension Plan Terminations: Procedures and
Liabilities, 444 PLI/Comm 51, 58 (1988); see also Keville, supra note 4, at 553.
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1995) (defining a defined contribution plan as a plan
providing an individual account for each participant).
151. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b).
152. See supra Part L.A.
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actually occurs under the existing defined benefit plan insurance program in
certain circumstances.
B. Reasons for Shortfalls
Two of the most prevalent reasons for shortfalls in defined benefit plans
are the failure of employers to contribute sufficient amounts for past service
costs, and unfavorable investment returns."5 3 The funding of ongoing defined
benefit plans is determined by the use of actuarial cost methods. Actuarial cost
methods estimate plan costs and assign the costs to appropriate years.' The
present value of pension benefits and liabilities depends on the actuarial
assumptions selected for interest, early retirement, turnover, and salary
increases.
155
The funding rules require a plan sponsor to contribute annually an
amount equal to the current plan year cost. This amount is referred to as the
"normal cost" of the plan.'56 The normal cost allocates future plan costs over the
life of the plan and can vary significantly depending on the actuarial assumptions
and the funding method used by the plan.
In addition to the plan's normal cost, the employer's annual contribution
must cover amounts attributable to supplemental costs. Unlike the normal cost,
the supplemental costs may not be funded at once, but rather must be amortized
over specified periods of time."5 Supplemental costs include amounts derived
153. See Canan, supra note 30, at 605, 609.
154. Cost are assigned to appropriate years to prevent the employer's deduction from
being too large, as well as to create a systematic funding schedule. See Jefferson, supra note 26,
at 5; McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 375; see IRC § 412. Any of several actuarial cost
methods maybe selected if the actuary certifies that the method and assumptions are reasonable
in the aggregate. McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 393-94. ERISA lists six acceptable
actuarial cost methods, but it is possible that additional methods may be designated as
acceptable by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. Any change in the method used may be made
only with the prior approval of the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
155. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at I I (citing Langbein & Wolk. supra note 5, at
228).
156. The normal cost will vary depending on the funding method selected. See
Jefferson, supra note 26, at 5. If a plan's cost is determined on the basis of accrued benefits, the
normal cost is the actuarial present value of the benefits accrued in a given year. Id. If the cost
is based on projected benefits, the normal cost is generally the level percentage of pay necessary
per year to fund the projected benefits for all years of service. Id.
157. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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from plan amendments, experience losses,"' inaccurate actuarial assumptions,
and past service credits.'59
Liabilities for past service credits are the most common supplemental
cost."6 Past service liability occurs when an employer gives credit for service
prior to the date on which the plan was established. 161 Thus, prospectively viewed
the past service liability, also known as the accrued liability, is the amount that,
together with future plan costs, is expected to cover all benefit costs incurred
under the plan.
62
The excess of the accrued liability over a plan's assets is the "unfunded
past service liability.' ' 63 When plans terminate before there is time to make
sufficient contributions to cover the past service liability, there will be
insufficient funding, unless errors in the accompanying actuarial assumptions are
offsetting.1
64
Regardless of how carefully the actuarial assumptions are selected,
advanced funding methods produce only cost estimates, not actual costs. 1 65 Thus,
typically a plan will either have a funding surplus or a funding deficiency, since
any deviation in the assumptions when compared with actual plan experience will
produce a shortfall, or a windfall.
66
When a defined benefit plan terminates with insufficient assets, the
PBGC pays the plan's vested accrued benefits at the time of termination. 67
158. Experience losses occur when actual plan costs exceed the actuarial estimates
for a given plan year. For example, if the actuary assumes that the plan investments will earn
8% and the investment earned only 5%, the plan will have a deficiency, or an actuarial loss. See
generally Canan, supra note 30, at § 12.3, at 607-1I; Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 285.
159. Supplemental costs also include waived funding deficiencies, which occur when
the Secretary of the Treasury, acting through the Internal Revenue Service, waives part or all
of a plan's annual contribution upon a showing of substantial financial hardship such that
making the plan contribution would adversely affect plan participants. See IRC § 412(d); see
also Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 290-91.
160. Past service liability can arise in two ways: (1) it may accrue for service rendered
before the plan was adopted, or (2) it may apply to service rendered by an employee after
adoption of the plan but prior to a plan amendment which provides increased coverage for such
service. See Canan, supra note 30, at 593.
161. "The past service liability is also referred to as the 'accrued liability.' Despite
its name, the accrued liability of a plan is not an accounting or legal liability." Jefferson, supra
note 26, at 5 n.21.
162. Id., at 5.
163. IRC § 412(b)(2)(B).
164. If, for example, there were substantially higher turnovers among nonvested
participants, there may be sufficient forfeitures to offset an incorrect interest rate assumption.
See Halperin, supra note 7, at 772-73.
165. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 11.
166. Id., at 12.
167. After five years of participation, the PBGC guarantees the participant's vested
accrued benefits. In order to fund the cost of the benefits, the PBGC uses the assets held by the
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Accordingly, the PBGC insures plan participants against shortfalls that arise
from the differences in the estimated funding cost and the actual cost of a defined
benefit plan.1" Regardless of which actuarial assumption is inaccurate, all
deficiencies are treated the same. If a plan experienced losses due to an erroneous
turnover assumption and ultimately terminated, the PBGC would be liable for the
unfunded vested accrued benefits. Similarly, if the deficiency were attributable
to an erroneous interest rate assumption, the PBGC would also be liable."6
In reality, the latter situation is more likely to occur.70 Because the
interest rate assumption typically reflects the long-term nature of the pension
obligations, a change in the interest rate assumption affects the valuation results
more than a change in any other actuarial assumption.'"I Although the impact of
an inaccurate interest rate assumption depends upon the number of years
involved, the age distribution of plan participants, and the weighting of plan
liabilities, 72 the rule of thumb to which actuaries generally adhere is that a 1/2%
change in the interest rate results in a change in liabilities of approximately 6%
in a valuation period. 73 Thus, accuracy of the interest rate assumption is
especially critical in preventing shortfalls.
underfunded plan and then makes up the shortfall with its own funds. Daniel Keating, Pension
Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L Rev. 65, 70 (1991).
168. The use of different funding methods could impact whether a plan has an actual
funding deficiency or not. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 31-32; see generally Norman P. Stein,
Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 Tax L Rev. 259, 265-67
(1989).
169. Provided the assumptions are reasonable.
170. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 54.
171. Id., at 54. A long term interest rate assumption is very difficult to project with
certainty. The impact of the valuation interest rate on pension costs estimates depends upon the
number of years involved in the interest discount, therefore, different parts of the evaluation are
affected differently by a change in the valuation interest rate assumption. However, there is a
rule of thumb to estimate the effect on liabilities of a change in the interests assumption. See
id., at 34 n.181 (citing Stuart G. Schoenly, Pension Topics 10-11 (1991) (Society of Actuaries
No. 460-24-91)).
172. The following comparisons illustrate the relationship between age and liability.
Age 7% factor as 8% factor as
a % of 6% factor a % of 7% factor
25 Deferred Life Annuity
commencing at age 65 64.2% 64.7%
45 Deferred Life Annuity
commencing at age 65 77.5% 77.9%
65 Life Annuity 93.5% 93.8%
Schoenly, supra note 171, at 19.
173. Id. at 18.
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Assuming all other assumptions are correct, when a plan experiences
losses due to erroneous interest rate assumptions, a funding deficiency would
result. 74 In such cases, if the plan terminated, and the employer were unable to
make an additional contribution, the PBGC would pay the unfunded vested
accrued benefits.175 When the PBGC pays any portion of the retirement benefits
in plans in which all actuarial assumptions other than the interest rate assumption
are correct, the PBGC effectively insures a minimum investment return.
Therefore, participants in defined benefit plans are insured against poor
investment performance.
The PBGC's guarantee of a minimum investment return in defined
benefit plans can be demonstrated best by a numerical illustration. Consider a
defined benefit plan that assumes an 8% investment yield, uses an accurate
mortality assumption and salary scale projection, 176 has made no past service
award, and uses an accrual formula of 2% times average compensation times
years of service. Assume Employee X is age 50, 100% vested, was hired at age
45, and received $50,000 of compensation for each of the last five years.
Employee X, therefore, currently has an accrued benefit of $5,000 per year. 1
77
Further assume that over the last five years, the plan has experienced
losses attributable to an actual 7% investment return, as compared to the 8%
return assumed by the plan. All other assumptions are accurate. Using the %
to 6% rule of thumb, there would be a shortfall of approximately 12%. If the
employer terminated the pension plan at this point, the shortfall in Employee X's
retirement benefit would be provided by the PBGC.178 In other words, the PBGC
would guarantee a retirement benefit based upon an expected investment return
of 8%. Interestingly, in a defined contribution plan there would be no insurance
protection if the account balances of plan participants were less than expected as
a result of unfavorable market conditions.
Opponents of federal insurance for defined contribution plans argue that
losses in defined contribution plans resulting from market fluctuations are too
difficult to measure.'7 9 Others argue that even if such losses are measurable, it
is inappropriate for the federal government to insure them because Title IV of
ERISA was established only to guarantee pension benefit promises, not minimum
investment returns. 8 As illustrated above, however, although it appears that the
174. This is true, unless there are offsetting errors in connection with the other
accompanying assumptions.
175. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
176. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 11.
177. 2% x $50,000 x 5 years = $5,000
178. See supra Part L.A.
179. See Keville, supra note 4, at 554.
180. See Keville, supra note 4, at 554 (stating that defined contribution plan insur-
ance might encourage "speculative investing by employees who are not risk averse, and could
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existing insurance program for underfunded terminated defined benefit plans
insures something other than a minimum investment returns on the plan assets,
this is exactly what occurs in certain instances. In fact, one of the most
significant risks against which a terminated defined benefit plan is protected is
market fluctuation. 8' Therefore, objections to insuring investment returns in
defined contribution plans on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the
underlying policy of ERISA's Title IV insurance are invalid. Furthermore,
resistance to defined contribution insurance because the insurable risks in defined
benefit and defined contribution plans are different is also unfounded.
C. Insurance Protection Outside of ERISA
Although there is no PBGC protection for defined contribution plans
under ERISA, participants investing in certain relatively safe low-risk, low-yield
instruments are nevertheless eligible for other insurance protection against
market down-turn. ' Stable-value investment contracts marketed by the banking
industry are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Similar instruments marketed by insurance companies are covered by state-
regulated insurance.'83 Thus, defined contribution plan participants investing in
relatively safe, low-yield investments are covered by some type of governmental
insurance."
1. Guaranteed Investment Contracts.-Historically, insurance
companies and banking institutions only provided investment management
services. In more recent years, however, both industries have expanded their roles
to include offering stable-value investment contracts, in addition to providing
managerial expertise." 5 The Guaranteed Investment Contract (GIC) is the stable
result in multiple payouts if employees repeatedly lost principle").
181. See Sean S. Hogle, The Employee as Investor The Case for Universal Applica-
tion of the Federal Securities Laws to Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 34 Win. & Mary L
Rev. 189, 240 n.96 (1992).
182. See discussion supra Part LA, infra Part ELF. G.
183. See FDIC, Facts About Bank Investments (last modified Jul. 27, 1999)
<http'//www.fdic.gov/depositinvestments/factslindex.html>.
184. As a result, some defined benefit plan participants have two levels of insurance
protection.
185. Pension assets are generally managed by a plan trustee. A trustee can be either
an employee of the plan sponsor, a bank, a trust company, or an insurance company. When the
assets are trusteed by an employee, bank, or trust company, the employer makes annual
contributions directly to the plan. When the funds are trusteed by an insurance company, the
employer pays the insurance company annual premiums in exchange for the insurance
company's promise to pay future plan benefits as they become due. See Emplo)ee Benefit
Research Institute Issue Briefs 15 (June 1994). See also Part ILC.
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value instrument offered by insurance companies. 186 They have flourished since
their inception in the early 1970's."8 The success of GICs is attributed to the
perception that they are extremely safe investments. 88 While the term
"guarantee" may imply that the insurer provides "fail safe" protection for the
return of the principal, the guarantee actually only applies to the interest rate and
expense schedule. 89 Thus, the safety of the entire instrument depends on the
solvency and credit worthiness of the issuing insurance company.9 '
Although interest rates paid to GICs have declined from their peak in the
late 1980's, GICs nevertheless have remained very popular.1 91 GICs are
regulated under state insurance laws which vary fromjurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Therefore, the level of protection and payment criteria vary.' 92 For example,
186. The term GIC is most often defined as a Guaranteed Investment Contract;
however, GIC sometimes is referred to as a Guaranteed Income Contract, Guaranteed Interest
Contract, or Guaranteed Insurance Contract. All of these terms convey the same meaning which
is a "fail safe guarantee of principal and a predetermined rate of interest to be credited over the
investment's life." Kenneth L. Walker, What is a GIC?, in Guaranteed Investment Contracts:
Risk Analysis and Portfolio Strategies 21 (Kenneth L. Walker ed., 1992).
187. William H. Smith, A Plan Sponsor's Perspective, in Guaranteed Investment
Contracts: Risk Analysis and Portfolio Strategies 1 (Kenneth L. Walker ed., 1992). Today's
GICs have an outstanding balance of approximately $200 billion and are issued at the rate of
approximately $40 billion annually. Id.
188. Keville, supra note 4, at 543-44. Additionally, the nonvolativity of GICs enable
the employer to avoid having to report negative returns in the annual financial statements given
to plan participants. Defined benefit plans generally have not purchased investment contracts
because of their low yield.
189. Walker, supra note 186, at 22.
190. GIC owners are considered the policyholder of the insurer. In most jurisdictions,
the policyholder enjoys a senior lien over the general creditors of the insurer. Thus, in the event
of bankruptcy, the policy holder would generally rank ahead of the general creditors of the
insurance company. Walker, supra note 186, at 22. See also Smith, supra note 187, at 1.
191. See Frederick C. Kneip, Synthetic BICs and GICs, 381 PLI/Tax 273,275 (1996).
Approximately 70% of all 401(k) assets are committed to GICs or other similar stable valued
options. See generally Walker, supra note 186, at 32.
192. Many amounts deposited by plans with an insurer are allocated to a separate
account. These separate accounts are generally deemed by state insurance laws to be the
property of the insurer. Robert E. Rice, Synthetic BICs & GICs, 339 PLI/PAT 321, 330-31
(1993). Consequently, if the insurer initiates insolvency or rehabilitation proceedings, the plan's
account may be frozen indefinitely, which could affect benefit liquidity or the interest rate
earned on the GIC. Id. It has been suggested that to avoid this, physical custody of the assets
could be placed in a third party. This would allow the plan uninterrupted access, and would also
make the insurer a fiduciary of the plan. Id. In addition, annuitants may have a claim in the state
liquidation proceedings. James Epstein, Protecting Pension Annuities When Insurance
Companies Fall: The ERISAFiduciary Standards, 44 Fla. L. Rev. 107, 110 (1992); see also Peter
A. Fine, What to do if Your Insurer is Insolvent, 439 PL/COMM 139 (1987). Also, insurance
industry practice has been to protect annuitants hurt by the collapse of an annuities company
through the state insurance regulations. Retirees at Risk: The Executive Life Bankruptcy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102
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under certain state insurance laws, GICs are protected against insolvency by life
insurance guaranty funds which typically limit the amount payable per claim)t93
2. Banking Izvestment Contracts.-The Bank Investment Contract
(BIC) is another type of stable-value instrument."9 BICs are offered by banks
rather than by insurance companies. 95 BICs are insured by the FDIC, up to
$100,000, per deposit, per account.
196
Until recently, when an employer sponsored a retirement plan invested
in BICs, a $100,000 cap applied to the plan as a whole. The cap did not pass
through to individual participants. However, in 1991 Congress passed the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),
Cong. 23 (1991) (statement of David George Ball, Asst. Secretary, Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor).
193. However, any attempt to access a guaranty fund to satisfy GIC claims against a
large insolvent insurer would raise the following issue:
most such funds are not "pre-funded"; instead, an assessment is made by
the fund against the remaining solvent insurance companies doing business
in the state only after the need to honor claims has arisen. If the claims
presented to the guaranty fund were very large, it might not be possible to
make sufficient assessments withoutjeopardizing the financial health of the
remaining insurance companies.
Rice, supra note 192, at 331. Itis uncertain whether a GIC purchased bya retirement plan would
constitute a single claim, or whether the per-claim provisions would "pass through." and apply
to each beneficiary of the plan. Whether the claim is viewed as a single claim or not determines
the applicable level of insurance protection under state law. Id.
194. The legal form of the BICs differs from bank to bank. Banks generally issue
BICs either in the form of time deposits or money market deposit accounts. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, which regulates the banking industry, provides definitions
for each form of deposit accounts in its regulations. David 1. Salvin, Bank Investment Contracts,
in Guaranteed Investment Contracts: Risk Analysis and Portfolio Strategies 37 (Kenneth L
Walker ed., 1992).
195. Although BICs are similar to GICs in many respects, the industry distinctions
between banking and insurance account for differences such as credit-worthiness, plan language,
government reporting, pricing, and most importantly, the availability of FDIC insurance.
Walker, supra note 186, at 38. The relative success of BICs stems from the desire for industry
diversification. Prior to the introduction of BICs, a plan wishing to offer a stable value option
was limited to GICs and money market funds. Sponsors were dependent upon the solvency of
the insurance industry. Id. at 38-39. BICs allowed emplo)ers to spread their investments over
two industries. However, simultaneously with the rise in BIC popularity, many large banks saw
their credit ratings drop, and experienced downgrades and negative press. The insurance
industry, being the familiar option, did not experience similar consequences. Id. at 39.
196. Both the principal and the interest of a BIC account are federally insured in
domestic member banks. A domestic member bank is "a depository institution that is a member
of the Federal Reserve." Michael Gordon Hales, The Language of Banking 114 (1994). National
banks are required to be members; state-chartered commercial banks and mutual savings banks
may become members at their election. Id. Member banks are owners of stock in Federal
Reserve Banks and choose some of the Reserve Bank directors. Id.
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which established pass-through insurance for certain banks that brokered
deposits to retirement plans."9 As a result, FDIC insurance currently applies to
individual plan participants as if they were individual depositors.9 8
3. Retirement Certificates of Deposit (CDs).-Retirement Certificates
of Deposit (CDs) are a personal savings alternative available to taxpayers
outside of the employer-sponsored regime. 99 A retirement CD is an insurance
contract that is invested in CDs. This arrangement offers tax deferral until
retirement on the investment returns, and provides guaranteed interest rates for
197. Under provisions set forth by the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and
Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, deposits of trusts may not be insured on a pass-through basis
"(A) if the trustee or an organizer of the trust solicits persons to transfer funds into the trust; (B)
if interests in the trust are sold to beneficiaries; (C) if there are more than 10 settlors or grantors
of the trust; or (D) in such other circumstances as the Board of Directors may prescribe." 137
Cong. Rec. S17910, S17923 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991). Additionally, banks must meet the
requirements of IRC §§ 401(a) and 403(b)(9). Pass-through FDIC insurance protection
generated considerable controversy. The American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) sought the
repeal of pass-through insurance legislation. The ACLI was established in 1976 after a merger
of several existing organizations. It currently represents 532 U.S. legal reserve life insurance
companies, providing industry reports, consumer brochures on insurance, and unified lobbying
efforts for life insurers at state and federal levels. See Nina Easton, Financial Industry Lobbyists
Come from Different Perspectives, American Banker, Oct. 19, 1985, at 11; see also American
Council of Life Insurance, httpJ/www.acli.com (as of March 1998). See Investments: Federal
Deposit Insurance Unnecessary Due to Existing Protections, Official Says, 18 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
781 (May 6, 1991) (maintaining that this result is dangerous as it tempts poorly capitalized
banks to offer very high yields in order to attract deposits, thereby increasing the likelihood of
bank failure).
198. In 1994, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation finalized regulations to
incorporate the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA)
relating to deposits for employee benefit plans accepted on a "pass-through" basis. Alson R.
Martin, Recent Developments Affecting PCs and Other Closely Held Businesses, C884 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1, 34 (Feb. 10, 1994). The regulations explicitly provide that the $100,000 limitation
applies to the aggregate interests of an employee's deposits with the insured institution under
all plans established by the same employer, or by the same employee organization. See id. at 35.
For purposes of the $100,000 limitation, IRA's and participant directed individual account plans
established by the individual investor are aggregated with employer sponsored amounts. See id.
at 35.
199. A Retirement CD is a special type of BIC. It is therefore accurate to refer to
Retirement CDs as BICs. Most BICs are issued as fixed-rate instruments, typically issued as
nonnegotiable, benefit responsive arrangements. They sometimes contain a window provision,
and often have early-withdrawal provisions that allow withdrawals to be made before maturity
for reasons other than benefit payments after the imposition of a market adjustment. When the
benefit-responsiveness and window features are removed, what remains is a fixed-rate,
nonnegotiable instrument that contains an early-withdrawal penalty. This instrument is known
as a time deposit or nonnegotiable certificate of deposit, or a Retirement CD. See McGill &
Grubbs, supra note 54, at 475-78.
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periods up to five years, on amounts payable as annuities.2- 0 The Retirement CD
is a savings option which is particularly attractive to individuals close to
retirement who are looking for safe places to store their personal savings.201
Currently, rates for Retirement CDs are better than national CD
averages; however, because funds cannot be transferred to other banks without
paying taxes and penalties, it is expected that banks will establish rates below
market levels during subsequent 5 year periods.' Presumably, heightened
consumer interest in Retirement CDs is largely attributable to the fact that these
savings arrangement are insured by the FDIC up to $100,000, per account, per
individual.
D. Defined Contribution Plan Insurance
FDIC insurance encourages investment in BICs and retirement CDs over
other noninsured forms of investment. However, an investment strategy that
disproportionately selects low-risk, low-yield instruments such as BICs, and
retirement CDs, contravenes the modem portfolio theory of investment which
emphasizes diversification as a means of maximizing investment returns.20 3
Therefore, the use of conservative investment strategy is not appropriate for long
term investment goals, such as retirement savings.
The fact that participants tend to under-diversify their investment
portfolios by disproportionately investing in stable-value instruments suggests
there is a need for Congress to enact laws which encourage participants to invest
their retirement savings more aggressively, rather than more conservatively.' °
A properly designed federal insurance program for defined contribution plans
could achieve this goal. A defined contribution insurance program which
guaranteed an average rate of return over a participant's working life would
encourage participants to invest more aggressively because a portion of the risk
of loss would shift from the participant to the insurer.' This approach is
consistent with ERISA's goal of increased retirement security, because a
200. These arrangements also rely on the favorable treatment of annuity contracts
under IRC § 1275(a)(1)(B)(i). See Stephen D. Palmer, Comment, What do you Get When you
Cross a Certificate of Deposit with an Annuity?: The Retirement Certificate of Deposit Struggles
for Survival, 45 Emory LiJ. 1429, 1432 (1996).
201. The high demand for Retirement CDs suggests that many savers are willing to
forgo higher returns and immediate penalty-free access to their funds in exchange for federal
insurance. See id. at 1459.
202. See Duff McDonald, Retirement CDs Offer More Than 7% - Plus Headaches,
Money, May 1, 1995, at 57.
203. See supra Part ILC.1.
204. See supra Part ILC.2.
205. See discussion infra Part IILE.I.
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balanced investment portfolio increases retirement security by maximizing long-
term returns.20 6
Federal insurance for defined contribution plans also would eliminate the
uncertainties and inconsistencies that result from the gap in insurance protection
for defined contribution plans. Under existing law, plan participants receive
vastly different levels of insurance protection of their retirement benefits
depending on the classification of their retirement plan, the type of investments
selected, and the states in which they reside .2' Federal insurance for defined
contribution plans would eliminate these inequities by conferring upon all
qualified plan participants some level of insurance protection.
Defined contribution plan insurance is a highly controversial concept.
Resistance to the idea includes both theoretical and practical concerns. There are,
for example, concerns about identifying the goals and objectives of the program.
There is also concern about defining an insurable accrued benefit in the context
of individual account plans. Furthermore, issues regarding the appropriate
insurance levels and applicable limitations would have to be resolved before a
defined contribution plan insurance scheme could be adopted.
While all of these concerns are valid and should be addressed prior to the
establishment of a defined contribution plan insurance program, they are not
unique to such a program. When the existing defined benefit plan insurance
program was established, policymakers found it necessary to address many of the
206. The most conservative investments are not necessarily the most prudent ones
since "'an investment can ordinarily be made which will yield a higher income and as to which
there is no reason to anticipate a loss of principal."' Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 56, at 1185
n.23 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227(a)).
207. The Executive Life crisis of 1988 best illustrates the magnitude of the threat
imposed by the gap in insurance. The Executive Life Insurance Company invested heavily in
junk bonds. When the market crashed in the late 1980's, Executive Life was unable to pay its
contracts and ultimately filed bankruptcy. While all plan participants whose assets were
invested in Executive Life were affected by the company's collapse, the damages were more
devastating for some participants than for others. Employee-participants in defined benefit plans
were accorded PBGC protection while those in defined contribution plans were not. Because
payments of defined contribution retirement benefits varied under state laws, some retirees
received as much as 70% of their retirement benefits, while others received none. Had investors
selected BICs instead of GICs, the participants would have been insured up to $100,000 per
account. From a pension policy perspective, it is difficult to justify this result. Until the
conservatorship of Executive Life, there had never been an instance when an insurance carrier
had not been able to honor its investment contracts. Therefore, the Executive Life crisis can be
viewed as a milestone in pension history. Policymakers should be aware of the level of
devastation that defined contribution plans can experience when retirement funds disappear.
Moreover, the Executive Life crisis should serve as a reminder that as long as the gap in federal
insurance protection exists for defined contribution plans, the promise of ERISA will not be
fulfilled for some plan participants. See Gary M. Ford, Defined Contribution Plan GIC
Litigation, Annuities Legislation, and PBGC Legislation, C996 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 183, 187 (1995).
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same issues, including the appropriate levels of benefits to insure, and the
necessary limitations to impose.' The pre-ERISA Committee placed limits on
the maximum insurable amount in defined benefit plans because it believed it
inappropriate to guarantee amounts in excess of a basic retirement benefitY'0 The
structure of these limits remains in effect today. Thus, there are many lessons
that can be learned from the existing defined benefit plan insurance program in
connection with the implementation of a new insurance program for defined
contribution plans.
E. The Hypothetical Account Proposal-An Ihsurance Model
The defined contribution insurance model proposed in this section is a
risk-based, voluntary program that uses a diversified hypothetical account to
determine the level of insured benefit. This proposal provides insurance
protection for defined contribution plans comparable in amount and objective to
the insurance protection currently available for defined benefit plans. Using this
approach, participants of defined contribution plans would be insured against the
risk of earning less than average investment returns, over their working lives.
Under the Hypothetical Account Defined Contribution Plan Insurance
Program, to the extent that a participant's account complied with a prescribed
diversification standard, she would receive a minimum benefit at retirement. The
minimum retirement benefits would based on hypothetical annual rates of
investment returns, and would be payable when the insured participant reached
her social security retirement age.2 Insured amounts would be payable in the
form of a life annuity, rather than a lump sum, in order to spread the risk of
payment over longer periods of time.2 '
Annual guaranteed rates of investment return would be determined by
the performance of a hypothetical account assumed to be invested according to
208. See Ford, supra note 207, at 186-87.
209. This figure has been amended since the establishment of ERISA in 1974.
Initially, defined benefit plans were insured up to the vested accrued benefit, not to exceed $750
per month and not more than 50% of wages. The current insurable benefit in a defined benefit
plan is the lesser of $30,000 per year, or 100% of compensation. 29 C.F.R. § 4022.22; see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
210. "The Social Security retirement age is currently 65, but it will eventually in-
crease to 66 for those born after 1938 and 67 for those born after 1954." Langbein & Volk,
supra note 5, at 268. Distributions prior to a participant's social security retirement age would
be permitted in the event of death or disability.
211. In order to avoid a possibility of initial payments being made based on a number
of years less than 5, under a defined contribution plan insurance program, only participants age
60 and below should be eligible to initially participate. This was a problem under the current
pension insurance program. As a result, when it was first established the PBGC had to pay large
sums that were attributed to years prior to the establishment of the insurance program.
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a prescribed diversification formula. For a given year, the guaranteed annual rate
of return would be the average of the annual hypothetical investment returns for
the five prior years. A five-year average is used instead of the performance of a
single year to diffuse the impact of sudden market fluctuations, and further
spread the risk of payment. The use of a five-year average to determine the
annual guaranteed minimum rate of return would also protect participants
against sudden downturns in the investment market.212
Insurance protection would be determined by the extent to which an
account complied with a prescribed allocation formula. In connection with the
prescribed allocation formula, it would be necessary to develop an indexing
system to evaluate all investment funds, so that the level of risk of a participant's
investment allocation could be compared to the risk of the prescribed
allocation.213 A ratings system similar to that supplied by the various rating
services, such as Standard and Poors, could be utilized to facilitate the indexing
process.214 Alternatively, a totally independent rating system could be developed
based on the historical investment performances, and long-term accumulation
projections for retirement plan assets 25.
The Hypothetical Account proposal allows sponsoring employers and
plan participants to insure some, or all, of an account balance, in exchange for
the payment of an annual insurance premium. Although the annual premium
would be paid separately from the individual accounts, the payment of an annual
premium would obviously impact a participant's investment position, by
decreasing the assets that remained available for her to contribute to the plan.
Even after taking the premium payment into account, however, in most
circumstances insurance protection under this proposal should provide a return
on aggregate employer contributions of an amount at least as great as the return
on an account exclusively invested in low-risk, low-yield instruments, such as
BICs.2"6 Thus, insurance protection under the Hypothetical Account insurance
212. However, if unfavorable market conditions existed over a sustained period of
time, the guaranteed rate of return would eventually reflect such losses.
213. For this purpose the Standard and Poors rating system could be used, or
alternatively, a new rating system could be developed.
214. "A Standard & Poor's insurance claims-paying ability rating is an opinion of an
operating insurance company's financial capacity to meet the obligations of its insurance
policies in accordance with their terms." Claims paying ability ratings are divided into two
broad classifications. Rating categories from AAA to BBB are classified as "secure" claims-
paying ability ratings and are used to indicate insurers whose financial capacity to meet
policyholder obligations is viewed on balance as sound. Rating categories. Allan G. Richmond,
Quality-Analyzing the Life Insurance Industry, in Guaranteed Investment Contracts: Risk
Analysis & Portfolio Strategies 100 (Kenneth L. Walker ed., 1992).
215. The investment practices for pensions typically reflect longer term investments.
216. If the insured rate is only slightly greater than the BIC return insuring, the
account balance generally would still be advantageous. However, it is plausible that the insured
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model should encourage risk averse individuals who are more likely to
disproportionately invest in stable-value instruments, to invest more aggressively.
Unlike the existing mandatory insurance program for defined benefit
plans, the Hypothetical Account insurance program would be voluntary. The
voluntary characteristic of the proposal strikes a balance between individual
choice and retirement income security. However, because of the voluntary
characteristic of the program, it is unlikely that all defined contribution accounts
would be covered.
The Hypothetical Account insurance model hinges on a diversification
formula, which defines an acceptable range of complementary allocations with
respect to both investment categories, and risk classifications. The diversification
formula would be designed to approximate an average rate of return for accounts
invested in average risk investment instruments over a participant's working
life.2" 7 For example, the safe harbor diversification allocation could be selected
consistently with the recommendations of financial planning experts2 who
advise individuals to place 60% of their investment assets in the stock of
companies with moderate volatility, 29 25% in "investment-grade" bonds, -- and
15% in stable-value instruments, for a moderate return.
The level of insurance protection and the cost of the insurance premium
would depend on the degree to which the participant's allocation complied with
the diversification formula. Using the established indexing system, a risk factor
rate would be substantially higher than that of the BIC because the safe harbor standard would
require some portion of the account to be put in stocks and some portion to be put in bonds,
which have rates that are generally higher than BIC returns. These instruments are currently
FDIC insured. See discussion supra Part IIC.
217. The diversification formula would have to take into account the different
recommendations for different age groups. Therefore the prescribed diversification formula
would account for the more aggressive investment strategies that are recommended at the front
end of one's working life as well as the more conservative strategy that is recommended at the
back end of one's working life. See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 56, at 1206-08.
218. See StrongFunds, Retirement Planning: Five Model Investment Strategies (visit-
ed Feb. 6,2000) <http://www.strong-funds.om/strng/Retirmencnt98fmd/products/5pies.htm>.
219. Beta is a measure of a stock's risk in relation to the market. For example, if the
market is up 10% over the last year, and a particular company's stock price is also up 10% then
the stock would have a beta of 1.0. The same principle applies when the market is down as
when the market is up. <www.duke.edu/%7echarvey/Classeslwpgbfglosb.htm>. See Campbell
R. Harvey, Hypertextual Finance Glossary (visited Feb. 6, 2000).
220. Most corporate or municipal bonds are graded by Standard & Poor's Corpo-
ration, by Moody's Investors Service, Inc., or both. The issuers must pay these agencies a fee
to review and to rate their bonds. Bonds are rated from the highest quality to the lowest on
either the Standard & Poors scale AAA/AAIA/BBB/BB/B/CCC/CC/CD, or the Moody's scale
AaaalAa/A/Baa/Ba/B/Caa/Ca/C/. Any bond rated in the top four categories is considered an




would be assigned to all allocations in order to compare their risk exposure to
that of the prescribed diversification standard. In order for an account to be fully
insurable at the regular premium rate, the participant's account could not be
exposed to an investment risk greater than that of the prescribed diversification
formula. Accounts having a risk factor greater than that of the prescribed
diversification formula would not be in compliance with the diversification
standard, and accordingly, not insurable at the regular premium rate.
A very simple model of a diversification standard exists under current
law for mutual funds. To qualify as adequately diversified, no more than five
percent of a mutual fund's assets may be invested in the securities of any one
issuer."2' The Hypothetical Insurance Model proposed in this section adopts a
similar approach. In order for an account to be insurable at the regular premium
rate, the Hypothetical Account proposal requires that the investment exposure of
a participant's portfolio be limited to the investment risk of the prescribed
diversification standard.
1. Calculation of the Guaranteed Benefit.-Under the Hypothetical
Account proposal, an individual's insurable principal would equal their annual
employer contributions times the annual guaranteed rates of return, for each year
of employment.222 Each year's guaranteed rate of investment return would be
based on the annual performance of a hypothetical portfolio, assumed to be in
compliance with the prescribed diversification formula. The annual performance
of the hypothetical account would be determined by the weighted average of the
annual investment returns for a hypothetical portfolio using the prescribed
diversification formula. The annual guaranteed rate of return for a given year
would equal the average of the annual rates of investment return for the
hypothetical account, over the five prior years.
An insured participant's minimumretirement benefit would be determin-
ed by comparing her actual account balance at retirement age to the Hypothetical
Account balance determined by the annual guaranteed rates of return for each
year of employment, prior to retirement. 23 If the participant's actual account
balance fell short of the hypothetical account balance determined by the annual
guaranteed rates of return, the difference would be paid by the insurer.
The Hypothetical Account insurance model is designed to protect the
participant against the negative effects of severe market contractions over the
221. See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 56, at 1208; citing former 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
5(b)(1) (1994).
222. The covered amount includes the elective contributions made by plan
participants.
223. However, the minimum guaranteed amount applies only to the extent that the
account had been invested according to the prescribed diversification standard.
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participant's working life. Thus, if the market took a sudden downturn
immediately preceding a participant's retirement, the participant would be
guaranteed at least an average return on her aggregate contributions over her
working life, notwithstanding her actual account balance at retirement.
Under the Hypothetical Account model, to avoid sudden fluctuations in
payment claims, insurance protection would not be available for early
distributions. Any distribution made from an account before a participant died,
became disabled, or attained social security retirement age would constitute an
early distribution.224 Even if the plan provided for such distributions prior to
normal retirement, such as for hardship, insurance protection would be
unavailable. At an insured participant's death, the insured benefit would be
calculated using the nonparticipant spouses's retirement age.' Under current
law, similar treatment is given in connection with Qualified Preretirement
Survivor Annuities (QPSAs) which provide survivor benefits to non-participant
spouses in the event that a participant dies before reaching retirement age.2 6
Insurance protection also would be unavailable for contributions made after
retirement age. If an individual worked beyond retirement age, the insured
retirement benefit would be unaffected by post retirement contributions or post
retirement market conditions.Y7
The following example numerically illustrates the proposed Hypothetical
Account insurance model. Assume that Employee X participates in a profit
sharing plan which annually contributes 10% of compensation. Also, assume that
Employee X had compensation of $100,000 throughout her employment, began
participating in the plan in 1986, and reached social security retirement age in
1995. Additionally, assume that the prescribed diversification formula was to
allocate 60% to stocks, 25% to bonds, and 15% to stable-value instruments. - s
Further assume that Employee X's entire account was insured at all times.'
The annual rates of returns for 1981-1995 are illustrated in column 5 of
Table 1 30 As described earlier, these numbers are assumed to be the composite
224. This approach is generally consistent with current pension law. "Under § 72(t).
a 10-percent additional tax is generally imposed on the taxable portion of any distribution made
before the employee attains age 591/2, other than distributions made after the employee's death
or by reason of disability. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5. at 349.
225. If the spouse were substantially older, there would be a sudden fluctuation.
226. The Retirement Equity Act (REAct) of 1984 mandates that plans recognize the
surviving non-employee spouse as a plan beneficiary. This benefit is referred to as a Qualified
Preretirement Survivor Annuity (QPSA). See Langbein and Wolk, supra note 5. at 555-56.
227. Because the insured benefit would be payable as an annuity, there could be some
adjustment to the benefit for the delay in the annuity starting date.
228. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
229. In other words, the account was in compliance each year with the prescribed
diversification standard.
230. The selected rates are assumed to reflect a composite of 60% moderately volatile
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annual investment returns of a hypothetical portfolio, assumed to be in
compliance with the diversification standard. 31 Column 6 of Table I illustrates
the annual guaranteed rate of return, based upon an average of the hypothetical
annual investment returns for the five prior years.
The actual composite rates of return for 1986-1995 are listed in column
2 of Table II. These numbers have been selected randomly to represent the
average actual rate of return for funds in a particular account, invested according
to the prescribed diversification formula.3 2
The annual contributions made to the employee's account for years 1986
through 1995 are listed in column 2 of Table III. The actual account balances for
the corresponding years are listed in columns (3)-(12) of Table HI.
The annual Hypothetical Account balances as determined by the annual
guaranteed hypothetical return for years 1986-1995. These numbers are listed in
columns (3)-(12) of Table IV.23'
Table V shows the benefit Employee X was entitled to receive at
retirement in 1996. The guaranteed minimum retirement benefit is the greater of
columns 1 and 2 in Table V, in the participants retirement year. If Employee X
had died or become disabled prior to her retirement date, the guaranteed benefit
would have been the greater of column 1 and 2 in the year in which the
participant's death or disability occurred.
When the participant reached age 65 in 1995, the actual account balance
was $190,325, and the hypothetical account balance was $203,824. Because the
insured account balance exceeds the actual account balance, the participant
would be entitled to receive the difference from the insurer. Employee X,
therefore, would receive $203,824 at retirement, rather than $190,325, payable
in the form of an annuity. While $190,325 would be paid from the participant's
individual account, the additional $13,499 would be paid by insurance. The
insured's benefit in this example represents an increase of more than 7% in the
participant's retirement benefit.
stock, 35% investment grade bonds, and 15% stable-value instruments. For purposes of this
illustration, the numbers in columns 2, 3, and 4, of Table I have been randomly selected.
231. The separate rates of return for stock, bonds, and stable-valued funds for 1981-
1995 are illustrated in columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table I, respectively.
232. The annual average hypothetical rate of return is a weighted average of 60%
stock, 35% bond, and 15% stable-value funds.
233. These numbers are derived by multiplying the insured interest rate (Table H,
column 2) by the actual contribution (Table Ill, column 2).
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* These numbers are selected randomly to represent the weighted average of actual returns for
an account invested according to the prescribed diversification formula.
2000]
Florida Tax Review [Vol. 4:9
Table MI
Actual Annual Account Balances*
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2. The Hypothetical Account Proposal and Insurance
Premiums.-Although insurance protection would provide greater protection
against shortfalls in the expected retirement benefit, the payment of annual
premiums would necessarily lower the net investment return for insured plan
participants. Thus, in some instances the participants' actual investment return
could be lower than the average return for uninsured accounts. 4 For example,
assume that the average composite rate of return for a diversified portfolio is
10% in a particular year, and the annual guaranteed hypothetical rate of return
is 9 %.235 Further assume that the regular annual insurance premium is
approximately 1% of the investment return. Therefore, in that year, participants
electing defined contribution plan insurance would receive a less than average net
return on their investments. 6 Specifically, insured participants would receive a
net annual rate of return of 9%, (a 10% actual return less 1% paid for the
premium) instead of the 10% annual return that an uninsured participant would
receive. 37 Similarly, if the market suddenly performed better than average, at
12% for example, an insured participant would receive a lower net rate of return.
If the market suddenly performed substantially worse than average,
however, the insured participant would receive a greater than average investment
return. For example, assume that the annual composite investment return fell to
7% in the next year, and the annual hypothetical guaranteed rate of return was
234. The after-premium rate of return.
235. The annual hypothetical rate of return is based on the average rate of return of
the hypothetical account for the five prior years.
236. This assumes that the annual guaranteed hypothetical rate of return is less than
10%.
237. The annual guaranteed hypothetical rate of return would be 10% minus 1% for
the premium payment, or 9%.
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92%. The insured participants in that year would receive a net investment return
of 8V2%, which is 1 % above the uninsured participant's investment return.
3. Noncompliant Investment Allocations.-For the regular premium
amount, insurance protection would be available to individuals who seek average
returns by means of the diversification formula. An average rate of return would
be guaranteed to individuals who take substantially lower than average risks, but
only if they were charged an additional risk related premium. The additional
premium would be economically derived to reflect the increased likelihood that
such an account would earn significantly less than the minimum guaranteed rate
of return. Therefore, paying higher premiums for below-average risk allocations,
could be viewed as functionally equivalent to a participant investing their funds
more aggressively." As a result, in this situation, defined contribution plan
insurance would not only guarantee some level of protection for accrued
retirement benefits in defined contribution plans, but also would help to solve the
problem of overly conservative investment practices.2
9
To illustrate, assume the same facts in the example above in which the
annual guaranteed rate of return is 91/2%, and the average composite rate of
return for a diversified portfolio is 10%. Further assume that a conservative
investment strategy yields 2% below the average market return, or 8% in this
particular year. Also assume that the additional insurance premium charged for
conservatively invested portfolios is 2% of the average investment return.
Accordingly, under normal market conditions, a conservatively invested, insured
participants would receive a net investment return of 71/%, which is 21/% less
than an uninsured average return, and 12% less than she would have received had
she not been insured and had invested conservatively.' 4
However, assuming the same 2% differential between average risk and
below average risk portfolios used above, if the market performed substantially
worse than average, at 7% for example, the under diversified uninsured portfolio
would yield only a 5% rate of return. If it is assumed that the guaranteed annual
rate of return is 9V2%, the insured participant would receive a net investment
return of 7 %, which is 2V2% more than the uninsured conservative investor,
and /2% more than the uninsured average risk investor.2"4 Thus, under the
238. For simplicity, it is assumed that the participant is 100% invested in stable-
valued instruments; however, if a participant invested 100% in stable-value instruments, it
would appear to be unnecessary to provide insurance protection as the assets would not be
exposed to very much risk. Thus, it would be more likely that the participant invested
somewhere between 100% and the prescribed percentage for stable-valued instruments.
239. See supra Part ILC.1.
240. That is, a guaranteed annual rate of return of 9 %, minus a 2% premium for the
use of conservative investment strategy.




proposed defined contribution plan insurance model, there are incentives for both
the average risk taker as well as the less than average risk taker to insure against
the risk of market fluctuations.
Insurance protection for the regular premium amount would not be
available to those who take greater than average risk with respect to either
investment category or risk classification, unless they demonstrated that special
circumstances warranted a deviation from the prescribed diversification standard.
For example, again assuming that the safe harbor formula were 60% stocks, 35%
bonds, and 15% stable-value instruments, a participant very close to retirement
who invested 85% in stable-value instruments and 15% in bonds, could still be
eligible for insurance protection at the regular rate, if it could be shown that the
allocation was not overly conservative in light of the participant's time
horizon.242 Under such a scenario, however, the participant would only be entitled
to receive a level of insurance protection based upon a lower rate of return
consistent with the asset mix for the regular premium amount. If, the
noncompliant asset allocation neither comported with the prescribed
diversification standards, nor satisfied a facts and circumstances test for the
diversification requirement, insurance protection would be unavailable, unless an
economically derived additional premium were charged.
4. Private Insurers.-The hypothetical insurance account model for
defined contribution plan insurance could just as easily be offered by a private
insurance company as by a federal agency.243 Private insurers could compete for
a share of the defined contribution plan insurance market by offering comparable
insurance protection at a lower premium. If the private sector became involved,
there would have to be some means by which the financial viability of the
insuring companies could be evaluated and monitored by the federal government.
Realistically, it is unlikely that the private sector could effectively compete
because the premium charged by the federal government would more than likely
always be less, since it could approach the insurance program as a revenue
neutral activity. Thus, the private insurer, who would have to charge a premium
sufficiently high to provide a profit margin, would be at a competitive
disadvantage.
242. Time horizon refers to the number of years left to save for retirement. This
strategy would be used in order to provide protection against a down turn in the market with
insufficient remaining time to offset such losses. A lower rate of return would be guaranteed
consistent with the asset mix, however.
243. Subject to regulation by the government.
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Interestingly, the private industry has not sought in any meaningful way
to offer insurance to defined benefit plans under the current insurance system.-
2
1
Perhaps one explanation is that under ERISA, PBGC insurance is mandatory for
all employers who sponsor defined benefit plans.245 Therefore, it is impractical
for a private insurer to compete because an employer choosing private insurance
would incur duplicate insurance costs. 246 If employers were permitted to
substitute private insurance for PBGC protection, the private industry would be
more likely to compete in the retirement plan insurance market.
Nevertheless, the existing defined benefit plan structure would seem to
provide greater incentives for private competition than a defined contribution
plan insurance program, because there can be funding surpluses in defined
benefit plans. 7 The possibility of the insurer capturing a portion, or all, of a
funding excess would appear to be sufficient to generate greater interest in
insuring defined benefit plans. For example, an insurer of defined benefit plans
could provide premium discounts in exchange for a pre-determined percentage
of a plan surplus in the event of plan termination.24 There are no such
possibilities in a defined contribution insurance arrangement because there are
no funding excesses in individual account plans. Therefore, the profits of an
insurer of defined contribution plans would be limited to the difference in the
insurance premiums charged and the payment of the minimum guaranteed rates
of return.
F. Regulating Defined Contribution Plan Insurance
1. The Moral Hazard Problent.-Just as a disparity in risk allocation
distinguishes defined benefit and defined contribution plans structurally, a
disparity in risk allocation also distinguishes the insurability of these plans.
When a defined benefit plan terminates with insufficient funds, the sponsoring
244. A participant can obtain insurance on their own to the extent that insurance
companies will provide insurance protection on an individual basis, but there is no established
program which would spread the risks among numerous plan participants.
245. See Daniel Keating, Chapter I l's New Ten-Ton Monster The PBGC and
Bankruptcy, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 806-07 (1993); see also supra Part LA.
246. Unless the PBGC elected to give way to private insurance.
247. An excess occurs in a defined benefit plan when the assumptions used by the
plan are more conservative than the experience of the plan. A plan's "experience" describes the
actual cost of the plan. Actuarial gain or loss is measured by the difference between the actual
cost of the plan and the actuarial estimates for a plan year.
248. When a plan terminates with excess assets, the employer is permitted to capture
the excess. This is referred to as a reversion. The employer, however, must pay an excise tax
on the reverted amount. Interestingly, in some instances, plans considered underfunded under
IRC § 412 standards can have excess assets at plan termination because the actuarial
assumptions for ongoing plans differ from those used in connection with terminating plans.
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employer is primarily liable for the asset deficiencies. The PBGC is only
secondarily liable.249 Therefore, an employer who sponsors a defined benefit plan
and does not anticipate insolvency is more likely to exercise caution to avoid
exposing the plan assets to unreasonable investment risks.250
By contrast, when a defined contribution plan terminates with
insufficient assets, there is no employer liability. Thus, a provider of defined
contribution plan insurance would be primarily liable for any deficiencies that a
participant experienced. Accordingly, the employer, or participant, making the
investment decisions would have no incentive to avoid exposing the account to
unreasonable investment risks.251
This concern expresses the moral hazard problem of insurance
protection: those who are insured against certain risks have no incentive to use
optimal care to avoid the insured risk252 For example, an employer sponsoring
an insured money purchase plan, who recognized that it had no liability for plan
losses, may invest disproportionately in high-risk, high-yield instruments in order
to reduce the amount of future employer contributions necessary to reach a
certain level of retirement benefit. 53 Alternatively, the employer may use the
same strategy to increase plan benefits. However, a similarly motivated employer
sponsoring a defined benefit plan would not choose to expose its plan assets to
unreasonable risks because the employer would be liable for any asset
deficiencies."5
Prior to the passage of ERISA, there was concern that the adoption of
defined benefit plan insurance would also encourage abusive practices regarding
risk exposure. Legislative history reveals that some policymakers specifically
feared that defined benefit plan insurance would enable employers to promise
excessively generous pension benefits in efforts to satisfy increasing labor
249. Employers will pay either by providing the benefits or by reimbursing the PBGC.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
250. If the employer anticipates insolvency, however, the employer may nevertheless
take unreasonable risks knowing that the promised benefits would be paid by the PBGC.
251. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis.
L. Rev. 65, 66-67.
252. For purposes of defining moral hazard problems it is important to distinguish
between two types of risks: reactive and fixed. A reactive risk is one over which the insured has
some control. An example of this type of risk would be an automobile wreck due to controllable
causes, such as speeding. A fixed risk is one for which the insured has no control, such as
damage from floods and other acts of God. "For a moral hazard problem to exist, there must be
some element of reactive risk involved." In other words, the insured must have some opportunity
to exercise due care. Id. at 68.
253. A money purchase plan is a defined contribution plan that has a definite
contribution formula. In contrast, a profit sharing plan is a defined contribution plan that can
have an indefinite contribution formula.
254. The employer would be liable to the PBGC.
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demands. 5 There was also concern that an employer might establish or amend
a plan to provide substantial past service benefits, realizing that if funding were
inadequate to pay the benefits, the PBGC would subsidize the remaining
deficiency.1 6 As a result, the pre-ERISA Committee determined that it was
necessary to adopt safeguards against this type of abusive behavior. The
Committee initially imposed restrictions on an employer's ability to recover from
the PBGC. It required employers to reimburse the PBGC for asset deficiencies
of up to 30% of the employer's net worth. --7 Subsequently, ERISA was amended




In connection with defined contribution plan insurance, it would be
necessary to adopt similar protective measures to address the moral hazard
problem. The prescribed diversification standard used in connection with the
Hypothetical Account model discussed above accomplishes this goal by placing
limitations on the level of risk to which an insured account may be exposed.29
2. The Impact of Defined Contribution Plan Insurance on the
PBGC.-Skeptics of defined contribution plan insurance protection maintain that
extending PBGC insurance protection to defined contribution plans would
intensify the financial troubles of the PBGC. ' This particular concern is valid,
however, only if the defined contribution plan insurance program replicated or
expanded the existing insurance program for defined benefit plans. A newly
established defined contribution plan insurance program should do neither. A
defined contribution insurance program should be uniquely designed to reflect not
only differences in plan type and plan structure, but also recent awareness of
design deficiencies in the defined benefit plan insurance program. 
6
Congress has conducted numerous studies to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the PBGC insurance program. These studies identify inherent
problems with the PBGC insurance program, paying special attention to the mid
1980's, when the PBGC's liabilities began to increase.2' Some studies have
concluded that the PBGC's financial problems primarily stem from the potential
liability of underfunded ongoing pension plans terminating. Other studies have
255. See generally Langbein & Volk, supra note 5, at 78-79.
256. See discussion infra Part IV.B, C.
257. See supra note 11 and accompanying texL
258. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 eliminated the 30% cap on the
plan sponsors' liability.
259. See discussion infra Part IV.B, C.
260. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 848-49.
261. See generally Keville, supra note 4, at 553-54.
262. Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Effect of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, 31 J.L & Econ. 85 (1988) [hereinafter Ippolito, Regulatory Effect].
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concluded that the real crux of the PBGC's funding crisis stems from the fact
that the PBGC is not structured as a bona fide insurance company. 63
Two characteristics distinguish the PBGC insurance program from the
bona fide insurance model used in the private sector. First, the PBGC premium
is not fully risk based. 264 As a result, healthy plans in thriving industries pay the
same premiums as barely funded plans in troubled industries. Second, the PBGC
premium is only partially economically derived.265 Consequently, extremely well
funded plans pay the same premium as plans that are only adequately funded.
Although there are new increased variable rate premiums which require
underfunded plans to pay higher premiums, there is still no corresponding
adjustment to decrease the premiums of well funded plans.266
The failure to calibrate PBGC insurance premiums to fully reflect risk
and cost results in a cross-subsidization from the beneficiaries of well funded
plans to less well funded plans.267 If a fully risk based insurance model were
utilized for defined contribution plan insurance, employers or participants who
invest in high-risk instruments would be required to pay more than those who
invest at average risks.268 Under such a model, the institution insuring the plan
could be no better or worse off economically for having established the
program. 269 As a practical matter, any proposal to federally insure defined
contribution plans should not duplicate the shortcomings of the existing insurance
263. See Richard A. Ippolito, Pension Security: Has ERISA Had Any Effect?, in
Langbein & Wolk, supra note 4, at 91, 93 [hereinafter Ippolito, Pension Security]; Ippolito,
Regulatory Effect, supra note 262, at 109-10.
264. See Ippolito, Pension Security, supra note 263, at 93; Ippolito, RegulatoryEffect,
supra note 262, at 85.
265. See Ippolito, Pension Security, supra note 263, at 93; Ippolito, Regulatory Effect,
supra note 262, at 109-110. Studies show that the PBGC needs to impose a flat rate premium
of at least $50 per participant to pay for its expected future liabilities. See Ippolito, Pension
Security, supra note 263, at 93. Even though the removal of the cap on variable premiums in
1994 was estimated to raise approximately $650 million per year, the PBGC expected that their
losses in future years will range between $12 and $20 billion. See Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your
Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection
of Pension Benefits, 24 Sw.U.L. Rev.145, 154-55 (1994). Thus, even with its increased rates,
the PBGC premiums still are not economically adequate.
266. "The flat-rate premium is $19 per participant, and the variable premium is $9
per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits with a maximum variable rate charge of $53 per
participant for a total maximum rate of $72 per participant." Wolfe, supra note 265, at 154.
267. William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 251, 256 (1993). A cross-subsidization of the beneficiaries as a class by the rest
of the population can also occur if the insurance funds become insolvent and the federal
government bails the companies out with general revenues. Id.
268. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 40-41.
269. Plans covering employees of troubled industries would be charged more because
there exists a greater risk of plan failure. See generally Ippolito, Pension Security, supra note
263, at 93-95 (contrasting the PBGC program with private insurance).
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program. The defined contribution plan insurance program should be a new
program with a risk-based premium. The Hypothetical Account model described
in Part IRl.E is an example of such a program.
3. The Problem of Bailouts.--Some commentators have expressed
concern that a defined contribution plan insurance program would increase
federal exposure, possibly leading to a bailout similar to that of the 1980's
saving and loan crisis. This is unlikely, however, because the need for the 1980
bailout developed out of circumstances unique to the savings and loan industry.
The savings and loan crisis occurred when savings and loan institutions
promised high investment returns in order to attract greater numbers of investors
and remain competitive in the financial lending market." In efforts to generate
sufficient income to pay the promised returns, the savings and loan institutions
invested in short-term high-risk bonds. When the underlying businesses for the
high-risk investments became insolvent, the savings and loans lost substantial
sums of money. As a result, they were unable to meet their financial obligations
as they became due. Therefore, it became necessary for the federal government
to bail out the industry.
Like the savings and loans, defined contribution plan sponsors and
participants would have incentives to maximize returns by investing in high-risk,
high-return instruments.27 However, the comparison between defined
contribution plan insurance and the savings and loan crisis is nevertheless
invalid. There were many factors in the savings and loan crisis which are
inapplicable to the retirement system. First, there is an important distinction
between the savings and loan industry and retirement plans with respect to cash
flow. Funds placed in savings and loan institutions are available to depositors
upon request. Therefore, when news that the savings and loans were experiencing
financial difficulties reached the public, many depositors withdrew their funds
from these institutions. This response made a bad situation worse.
270. The savings and loan problem began in 1980 when interest rate legislation was
passed which deregulated the liabilities (i.e., deposits), but not the assets of the savings and
loans. Soon after, federal tax incentives were introduced in 1981 and 1982 which encouraged
real estate projects to be undertaken that were not economically viable. During the same time,
the federal government tightened the money supply, which caused government bond interest
rates to rise. This situation forced the savings and loans to seek higher short term rates through
junk bonds. Making matters worse, in 1986 oil plunged to SIO a barrel, and the income tax
incentives were taken away with no grandfather provisions. Also, one year later the stock market
plummeted, and finally in 1989 the Financial Institution's Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA) imposed higher capital standards on the thrift industry, creating a situation in
which more savings and loan institutions had to be seized by the government than had been
anticipated. Yakoboski, supra note 3, at 18.




In contrast, in retirement savings arrangements early distributions are
generally disallowed unless specific events occur, such as early retirement,
disability, or death.272 Even when other early distributions are permitted by the
plan, a 10% excise tax ordinarily applies to discourage participants from
withdrawing their funds prior to retirement age.273 Furthermore, an insurance
program for defined contribution plans could impose additional restrictions on
payment. Under the Hypothetical Account Model for defined contribution plans
proposed in Part Ill.E, insurance protection would be unavailable until a
participant attained normal retirement age, became disabled, or died,
notwithstanding the distributable events allowed by the plans.274 Thus, the
distribution rules of ERISA, as well as additional restrictions imposed by the
insurance program, would prevent a single event from increasing the volume of
insured claims as it did in the savings and loan crisis.275
The second difference between the FSLIC's guarantee of savings and
loan funds and a guaranteed benefit in a defined contribution plan program is
industry diversification and its impact on the incident of failure. The funds
guaranteed in the savings and loan crisis were exposed almost exclusively to the
risk of a single industry, real estate. Thus, the savings and loan funds were
extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in a particular market. By contrast,
retirement plan assets are ordinarily more diversified. Specifically, defined
contribution plan accounts in compliance with the diversification formula of the
Hypothetical Account model described above, are required to be invested in
multiple markets according to the prescribed portfolio mix.276 Therefore, it is
unlikely that defined contribution plans would fail as a result of the collapse of
a single market. Moreover, because the guaranteed minimum benefit under the
Hypothetical Account model would bebased on a five-year average rate of return
instead of the performance of a single year, there would be an additional measure
of protection for the insurer.277 As a result, any fluctuations in the market would
be spread over a period of years.
The third difference between the savings and loan crisis and the
retirement system is the presence of fraud and mismanagement. The savings and
loan crisis did not result merely from aggressive investment activity. Fraud and
272. See Regs. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i).
273. Distributions before a participant reaches age 592 are normally considered
early. Exceptions to the 10% excise tax on early distributions are found in IRC § 72(t).
274. See discussion supra Part IE. 1.
275. Limitations on the insured amounts, such as those discussed in connection with
the Hypothetical Account insurance model, would also prevent a brief period of fluctuations in
the financial market from triggering the level of insurance claims filed during the savings and
loan crisis. See Yakoboski, supra note 3, at 20.
276. See supra Part DJ.E.1.
277. See supra Part IME describing the Hypothetical Account proposal.
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mismanagement were present in approximately 60% of the savings and loan
failures, and directly linked to the insolvency of at least 25% of the failed
institutions, while evidence of fraud and mismanagement in pension plans is
relatively low.27 This fact alone suggests that a defined contribution plan
insurance program would not be exposed to the same risk of failure that the
savings and loan industry was exposed to in the 1980's. 79
G. The Floor-Offset Pension Plan Comparison
While the Hypothetical Insurance model discussed above proposes a new
method of guaranteeing a minimum benefit in defined contribution plans, a
minimum benefit in connection with defined contribution plans is not a totally
new concept. A type of minimum benefit protection similar to that provided by
the Hypothetical Defined Contribution Model currently can be achieved if an
employer adopts a floor-offset pension plan.= Thus, insuring defined
contribution plan retirement benefits is neither theoretically nor practically as
different as one may initially believe.
A floor-offset plan, also known as a feeder plan, is a hybrid
arrangement. While most hybrid arrangements are single plans which combine
characteristics of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, the floor-
offset plan consists of two separate plans: a defined benefit and a defined
contribution plan. The defined benefit plan is the "floor" plan. The floor plan
uses a standard formula to establish a minimum benefit level that represent the
employer's income replacement goals. The formula may take into account age,
service, and compensation.
The defined contribution plan is the "base" plan. The employer makes
the annual contributions to the base plan." If the base plan provides a benefit
278. See Yakoboski, supra note 3, at 20.
279. Another difference not discussed in the text of this article is the significance of
loan participation in the savings and loan crisis. As the savings and loans found themselves
constrained by limits on the amount they could lend to a single borrower, they began to sell
portions of loans to other institutions. Many of the secondary lenders relied on the underwriting
capacities of the originating savings and loans. Thus, the savings and loans were extremely
vulnerable. Although a large proportion of defined benefit plan assets are placed in bank pooled
funds and similar investments where investment results are shared, the investment strategy is
fundamentally different. Id. at 20.
280. The majority of firms with floor-offset plans have between 5,000 and 20,000
employees, according to a study conducted by Robinson and Small in 1993. Typically. floor
offset plans provide a floor benefit for a career employee of between 40 and 60% of pre-
retirement compensation. EBRI, Special Report, Hybrid Retirement Plans: The Retirement
Income System Continues to Evolve 18 (1996) [hereinafter EBRI].
281. Any defined contribution plan can be used as the base plan in a floor-offset plan;
however, the standard profit sharing plan is most frequently used in such arrangements.
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at least equal to the minimum established under the floor plan, the participant
receives the balance of the defined contribution account as her retirement
benefit.282 In such cases, no benefit is paid from the floor plan. If, however, the
defined contribution plan provides less than the minimum benefit established
under the floor plan, as a result of investment performance or inflation, for
example, payments will be made from the floor plan to offset the shortfall in the
base plan benefit.
The floor-offset plan is generally offered by employers who wish to
maximize both the flexibility of defined contribution plans, and the retirement
income security of defined benefit plans.2 3 In a floor-offset plan, the employer
typically is responsible for the investment of assets in both the defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. If the participants rather than employers
controlled the investments of the funds in the defined contribution base plan, in
cases where the floor-offset plan was set at a sufficient level the participants
would have incentives to invest in high-risk, high-yield instruments, knowing that
the minimum benefit under the defined benefit floor plan would be adequate for
retirement.2" However, because the employer is the party making the investment
decisions, and the one who bears the risk of a shortfall in the expected retirement
benefit, the moral hazard problem is avoided.2" 5
Interestingly, when the minimum benefit level in a floor-offset plan
roughly approximates an average investment return on employer contributions
over a participant's working life, the floor-offset arrangement provides a
minimum retirement benefit guarantee very similar to the minimum benefit
guarantee described under the Hypothetical Account proposal described in Part
II.E. In both cases, participants are guaranteed receipt of a minimum benefit at
retirement. The minimum benefit is calculated with reference to an expected
return over the participant's working life. The major difference between the two
guarantees is the source of the guarantee. In a floor- offset arrangement, the
expected retirement benefit in the defined contribution plan is guaranteed through
the defined benefit floor plan. In the Hypothetical Account proposal, a
282. See EBRI, supra note 280, at 17.
283. Another situation for which a floor offset plan would be offered is a situation
where the key employees are older and do not have sufficient time to accrue adequate retirement
benefits under a traditional defined contribution plan. Thus, by offering a floor offset plan, these
employees could be assured of receiving the desired level of income replacement at retirement
from the defined benefit floor plan. See EBRI, supra note 280, at 18. As is the case with most
hybrid retirement plans, there are many different plan designs. Because of the presence of both
a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan, the floor offset plan may incorporate design
features that are typically limited to one plan type or the other. Id.
284. See supra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
285. Because the minimum benefit in a floor offset arrangement is provided by the
defined benefit floor plan, the investment risk in a floor plan is substantially borne by the
employer. See supra notes 252-54.
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governmental agency similar to the PBGC guarantees the benefit through a bona
fide insurance prograrn.2 6 In both cases the potential for the moral hazard
problem of insurance protection is essentially eliminated. In the floor-offset plan,
there is no moral hazard problem because the employer makes the investment
decisions. In the Hypothetical Account Insurance Model, there is no moral
hazard problem because the diversification standard restricts the use of overly
aggressive investment strategies.
The use of floor-offset plans is not prevalent.2 Because the floor-offset
plan involves both a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan, the
administration of such plans is more complicated than that of either type plan.
Additionally, because the cost of the plan depends on the contributions made to
the defined contribution offset plan and their investment build-up, a highly
volatile portfolio in connection with the offset plan could result in losses and
increase the funding of the defined benefit floor plan. Consequently, the cost of
the floor plan could be more expensive than maintaining either a traditional
defined benefit plan or a traditional defined contribution plan.' Therefore, most
employers would not choose to provide floor-offset plans because of the
additional costs and administrative burdens associated with maintaining floor
offset plans.
Although the existence of the floor-offset plan demonstrates that the
concept of defined contribution plan insurance is neither theoretically nor
practically impossible, the limited use of such plans suggests that they have little
impact on the retirement income security of the majority of defined contribution
plan participants. Therefore, to ensure that more than a nominal percentage of
defined contribution plan participants receive adequate protection against
retirement benefit shortfalls, a guarantee of a minimum benefit should be
available to all defined contribution plan participants through a defined
contribution insurance program.
IV. FUNDING SHORTAGES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
A. Funding Under ERISA
Pre-ERISA funding rules were not only inadequate in providing financial
security for plan participants, but also created many problems related to
286. See supra Part IILE.
287. See Cash Balance Pension Plans and Other Hybrid Retirement Plans,
<http'//www.ebri.orgtfundamentals/chptO.html>; see also EBRI, supra note 280.
288. Although some employers who establish floor-offset plans view the defined
contribution plan as the primary retirement saving vehicle, many others view the defined benefit
plan as the primary vehicle. Consequently, they recognize the defined benefit plan cost at all
times. See EBRI, supra note 280, at 18.
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underfunding.289 Participants often did not receive the benefits they expected
from plans that were in compliance with the existing funding rules.290 Shortfalls
in the expected retirement benefits are serious problems. Shortfalls threaten the
financial security of plan participants not only because the retirement benefit
received from the plan is more likely to be insufficient for the participant's
retirement needs, but also because in reliance on their expected retirement
benefits, participants are likely to have decreased personal savings. Furthermore,
when the participant becomes aware of the shortfall, there likely will be too few
years of employment remaining to appreciably increase personal savings to offset
the loss of benefit.29' As a result, when retirement plans are inadequately funded,
participants may be worse off than they would have been in the total absence of
a plan.
Therefore, in addition to strengthening the fiduciary rules and creating
a federal insurance program, ERISA established minimum funding standards to
help prevent funding shortages in qualified retirement plans.2" The purpose of
the funding standards is twofold. The funding standards not only provide greater
289. One such case was the Studebaker case. This case made policymakers aware of
the inadequacy of the existing funding requirements and consequently caused them to focus on
plan funding and related matters. Thus, "the closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in
South Bend, Indiana, in December of 1963 is regarded as a pivotal event" leading to the
enactment of ERISA. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 62. As a result of the plant closing,
5,000 workers were dismissed and 1,800 more eventually lost their jobs. Id. When the plant
closed, the company entered into an agreement with the United Automobile Workers (UAW)
for the termination of its pension plan. Id. at 63. "The termination agreement implemented the
default priorities contained in the plan." Id. It divided the plan participants into three groups and
paid their benefits accordingly: (1) 3,600 retirees and active workers who had reached the plan's
normal retirement age of 60 received their full benefits in the form of life annuities, (2) 4,000
employees age 40 to 59 who had at least 10 years of service with the employer received lump
sum payments representing approximately 15% of the actuarial value of their accrued benefits,
and (3) 2,900 workers had no vested rights and received nothing. Id.
290. See also Jefferson, supra note 26, at 8-9.
291. See id. at 18-29.
292. See IRC § 412 (1998). The funding rules of this section are enforced with severe
penalties. Any plan that fails to comply with the appropriate minimum funding standard must
pay an excise tax equal to 10% of the underfunded amount, in addition to an interest charge. If,
the plan fails to correct the deficiency after receiving notification from the IRS that a deficiency
exists, an excise tax of 100% of the deficiency is imposed. See Canan supra note 30, at 652.
Plan costs are determined through actuarial valuations which estimate the cost of the plan and
assign charges to the appropriate plan years as annual payments. In order to produce such
estimates, the actuary must make assumptions about the future experience of the plan including
the rate of investment return on plan assets, turnovers resulting in forfeitures of nonvested
benefits, salary increases, the retirement age of plan participants, and the number of participants
electing optional benefits offered by the plan. Thus, the amount that an employer is required to
contribute in a particular year to properly fund a plan can vary tremendously depending on the
actuarial assumptions used for each of these incidents.
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retirement security to plan participants but also provide greater protection for the
PBGC against underfunding in defined benefit plans.2 3
The minimum funding standards apply to all defined benefit plans, and
some defined contribution plans. 294 Because they are required to have definite
contribution formulas, money purchase plans and target benefit plans are two
types of defined contribution plans which are subject to the minimum funding
rules. Profit sharing plans are not subject to the minimum funding rules because
they are not required to have a definite contribution formula. 5
In a defined contribution plan, if the required contributions are not made
and the plan terminates, there is no PBGC protection, although there would most
likely be shortfalls in the expected retirement benefits. In a defined benefit plan
if the required contributions are not made and the plan terminates, the employer
and the PBGC would be liable for the payment of the expected retirement
benefits. Thus, adequate funding is even more critical to the retirement income
security of plan participants in defined contribution plans than in defined benefit
plans, since neither the employer nor the PBGC is liable for the shortfalls.
Even though the funding rules do not require it, employers who sponsor
defined contribution plans frequently fund toward ERISA's maximum
permissible amount because of other considerations."6 When defined
contribution plans are funded toward specific income replacement goals, funding
shortages can occur if insufficient contributions are made. Although the funding
rules help to prevent deficiencies attributable to inadequate funding in defined
benefit plans, they do little to prevent deficiencies attributable to inadequate
funding in defined contribution plans.29 For defined contribution plans, the
funding rules require only that plans annually contribute amounts specified by
293. Canan, supra note 30, at § 12.1, at 605. The funding rules require that employers
contribute annually at least the normal cost of the plan and the amount necessary to amortize any
unfunded liabilities over a period ranging from 15 to 40 years. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at
6; see also McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 381-82.
294. Canan, supra note 30, at § 12.2, at 606. Money purchase plans and target benefit
plans are subject to the minimum funding standards. The minimum funding standard for money
purchase pension plans require the plan to contribute an amount which does not depend upon
the uncertainties of actuarial assumptions. The rules are similar for target benefit plans.
However, the funding rules provide that all pension plans-whether defined contribution or
defined benefit-are subject to the IRC § 4971 excise tax, if the required contributions are not
made to the plan. Id. The excise tax is 10% of the underfunded amount, and 100% of the
underfunded amount if the underfunding is not timely corrected after notification by the IRS.
Id. at 605.
295. Profit sharing plans are permitted to make discretionary contributions. Stock
bonus plans, like profit sharing plans, are also excluded from the minimum funding standards.
296. IRC §§ 404.
297. However, most defined contribution plans are profit-sharing which are not




the plan's contribution formula.298 Thus, in addition to inadequate fiduciary rules
and the absence of insurance protection, inadequate funding rules are another
reason defined contribution plan participants may not receive their expected
retirement benefits.
B. Minimum Funding Standards and Past Service Credits
As described in Part II, when a plan is established, a participant's
expected retirement benefit consists of two parts: the portion attributable to
future earnings and the portion attributable to past earnings.299 While it is the
entire retirement benefit that the participant ultimately relies upon, the two
portions of the retirement benefit describe conceptually distinct benefits.
Consequently, they are treated very differently for funding purposes.
Retirement benefits are deferred compensation. The benefits are earned
during employment, but paid during retirement.3" When a plan is newly
established, the portion of the expected retirement benefit attributable to future
years presumably will be funded by a reduction in current wages. For example,
if a retirement plan provides an annual contribution of 10% of compensation and
a participant earns $50,000, the participant will receive a plan contribution of
$5,000. °0 In that same year the employee's wages would be reduced by a
corresponding amount.3 2 If the plan were to terminate the next year,
theoretically, the employee's wages should increase.3 3 From the additional
compensation, the employee would be able to increase personal savings to offset
any reduction in the expected retirement benefit that resulted from the plan's
premature termination.
Therefore, because there is a corresponding increase in current wages
which allows increased personal savings, participants could have no reasonable
reliance on their expected benefits to the extent that they are attributable to future
earnings. By contrast, however, if one believes that past service benefits are
entirely related to past periods of service, theoretically, compensation from
298. The funding rules have limited application to money purchase plans and target
benefit plans. The rules have no applicability to profit sharing plans. See Canan, supra note 30,
at 606.
299. Past service liability occurs when a retirement plan provides a benefit for service
before the establishment of the plan or provides for retroactive benefit increases. See supra Part
IILB.
300. This "commonly accepted modem account of pension obligations" is referred to
as the deferred wage theory. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at 16.
301. Interest is not accounted for.
302. There are numerous theories as to the benefits' impact on compensation. See
Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 137, at § 12.1.1, at 205.
303. There is no adjustment for interest and the tax-free build-up.
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previous periods would have already been cut, in order to fund the benefit
attributable to past service. Consequently, if the plan terminates, to the extent
that past service benefits have not been funded, a participant's current wages
would not increase." The participant, therefore, may be unable to increase
personal savings to offset the reduction in the expected retirement benefit. This
result suggests that it is reasonable for the participant to rely on the portion of
the expected retirement benefit attributable to past service since there is neither
a corresponding wage increase, nor sufficient time to offset a reduction in the
expected retirement benefit." 5
When a newly established plan gives credit for past service, the plan has
an unfunded initial past service liability because the plan has liabilities for prior
years of service, but no assets. 306 These liabilities are generally funded over a
period of thirty years.31 It is unlikely that such a plan will ever be fully funded,
however, because ongoing plans typically fund not only the initial unfunded
liability over thirty years, but also subsequent past service liabilities over
additional thirty year periods. If a plan with past service credits continues in
operation, liabilities for past service generally will not cause a funding
shortage.30 8 If the plan terminates before all of the funding periods have expired,
however, the plan will have insufficient assets to cover the plan's accrued
liabilities. 3' Thus, notwithstanding compliance with ERISA's minimum funding
304. For example, consider a 64 year old participant. It would obviously have to be
some other participanCs wages that were reduced to fund the past service portion of the 64 year
old's benefit.
305. See Jefferson, supra note 26, at 48.
306. For a more detailed discussion see Halperin, supra note 7, at 771.
307. Allowing past service credits to be funded over 30 years has been responsible
for underfunding in a large number of plans. Because of concerns about funding inadequacies
the Pension Protection Act of 1987 mandated more rapid funding of underfunded plans with
more than 100 participants. ERISA § 302(d); IRC § 412(1). "For such plans, the minimum
required contribution is the greater of (1) the amount determined under the normal funding rule,
or (2) the sum of (a) normal cost, (b) the normal charges and credits reflecting changes in
actuarial assumptions and net experience gains or losses, (c) the 'deficit reduction contribution,'
plus (d) the 'unpredictable contingent event amount.' " See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 5, at
287. For plans in existence on January 1, 1974, the amortization period is forty )ears. See IRC
§ 412(b)(2)(B)(i).
308. The initial unfunded accrued liability can be funded over periods as short as 10
years or over periods as long as 30 to 40 years, depending on the effective date of the plan. See
McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 399. If, however, no additional amendments were made to
the plan, the plan would be fully funded in exactly 30 )ars from its establishment date. See
Halperin, supra note 7, at 77 1.
309. Payments for certain plan liabilities are projected over periods ranging up to 30
years; thus, when a plan terminates prematurely and all of its accrued liabilities become due and
payable, the plan would most likelybe unable to pay the retirement benefits of plan participants.
However, inadequate funding can occur for numerous other reasons. The use of erroneous
actuarial assumptions in the projection of future plan costs can either overstate plan assets or
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standards, a plan can be inadequately funded on plan termination. As a result
there would be insufficient assets to pay the portion of the benefit attributable to
the past service credits.31 °
In defined benefit plans, the entire vested accrued benefit is insured after
five years by the PBGC, including the portion of the benefit attributable to the
past service credit. In defined contribution plans, no portion of the retirement
benefit is insured, including the portion of the retirement benefit attributable to
past service. Thus, if a defined contribution plan terminates prematurely, plan
participants could experience shortfalls in both the past and future portions of
their expected retirement benefits. This result is inappropriate if one accepts the
theory that the portion of the expected retirement benefit attributable to past
earnings in both types of plans is inherently different than the portion of the
benefit attributable to future earnings. Conceivably, the past service benefits in
all plans could be insured by the time a participant reaches normal retirement
age, even if the future service benefits are not.
C. Past Service Liabilities in Defined Contribution Plans
The rationale for requiring participants in defined contribution plans to
assume the risk of adverse market conditions with respect to the accumulation of
the future benefit does not adequately explain why they should be required to
assume the risk with respect to the portion of their benefit attributable to
previously earned amounts. Most defined contribution plans do not expressly
distinguish between the portions of the benefit attributable to future costs and
those attributable to past costs. In defined contribution plans, annual
contributions are usually based upon a certain percentage of compensation.3"'
For example, a plan may require the employer to annually contribute 10% of
each participant's compensation, and there generally would be no explicit
recognition of a liability for past service. It would therefore appear that defined
contribution plan sponsors ignore service prior to the establishment date of the
understate plan liabilities, resulting in plan losses. The adoption of plan amendments, which
provide more generous plan benefits, can also create funding deficiencies.
310. The past service liability would not present a problem as long as the plan
continues to operate because contributions would generally exceed the benefits paid out. See
Halperin, supra note 7, at 771.
311. See Canan, supra note 30, § 3.52, at 174.
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planforpurposes of allocating annual contributions."a 2 However, this assumption
is not necessarily correct.
Certain hybrid defined contribution plans explicitly award past service
credits. The target benefit plan is an example of such a plan. 3' The target benefit
plan computes the retirement benefit in the same manner as a defined benefit
plan.314 When a target benefit plan is established, a projected retirement benefit,
or "target" benefit, is calculated for each participant. 315 The employer's annual
contribution level is the sum of the amounts that are needed to annually fund each
participant's targeted benefit.3" 6 The annual contribution is then allocated to the
individual accounts according to the amount necessary to fund each participant's
targeted benefit.3" 7 Because the target benefit plan uses a benefit accrual formula
312. See Wayne J. Howe, Education and Demographics: How do They Affect
Unemployment Rates?, I I I Lab. Rev. 3 (1998). The method of contributing under profit sharing
and stock bonus plans provides the employer greater flexibility. In such plans employers are
permitted to make annual discretionary contributions subject to certain limitations. See Canan,
supra note 30, at 94. Plans having cash or deferred provisions generally do not take into account
past service. However, there are certain ways in which they might. For example, a plan could
permit a higher deferral percentage for employees with a certain length of service. Extreme care
would have to be taken so as not to violate the antidiscrimination norms. Id. at 174.
313. After the annual contributions are determined and allocated, the target benefit
plan operates like any other defined contribution plan. At retirement, the individual's account
may be paid in a lump sum or used to purchase an annuity. However, the actual benefit could
be more or less than the target benefit, depending on whether the actual investment earnings of
the fund and the annuity purchase rates were more or less favorable than the actuarial
assumptions used to calculate the contribution levels, or whether the plan did not terminate
prematurely. See McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 115. The target benefit plan is easier to
administer than a traditional defined benefit plan. No actuarial valuations or reports are
required. Thus, although the target benefit resembles a defined benefit plan in many respects,
its allocation of investment risk is very different. As a defined contribution plan, the participant,
bears the risk of unfavorable investment returns rather than the employer. Therefore, if the plan
terminates early or if there is a substantial deviation in the experience of the plan as compared
to the actuarial assumptions used by the plan, a participant's retirement benefit could differ
drastically from the targeted amounts. Because the target benefit plan is an individual account
plan, and the retirement benefit is based on the value of the participant's individual accounts,
the target benefit plan is excluded from PBGC coverage. Therefore, there is no federal insurance
protection for target benefit plan participants if the plan terminates with insufficient assets. See
id.
314. See Halperin, supra note 8, at 176. See Employee's Right to Convert Policy Not
Incident to Ownership, IRS Says, Vol. 11, No. 36, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1135 (Sept. 3,
1984).
315. The targeted benefit assumes that each participant wvill work until normal
retirement age.
316. As is the case of all defined benefit plans, the target benefit plan provides higher
contributions for older, more highly compensated emplo)es.
317. See McGill & Grubbs, supra note 54, at 115. The contributions are determined
by multiplying the target benefit by a factor in the plan that varies by age. Id.
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to determine the retirement benefits,"' it is possible for the employer to account
for service prior to the establishment of the plan, by expressly awarding past
service credits.
The use of past service credits in a target benefit plan is illustrated by the
following example. Assume an employee age 45 has 10 years of service at the
time a target benefit plan is established, and the plan recognizes past service. If
the plan provides 1% per year of service, the employee can expect a 30% benefit
at age 65, assuming the plan's investment performance is predicted accurately.
The employee, accordingly, could assume a 10% benefit has already been earned
when the plan is established.
If level contributions are made over the next 20 years, there will be
sufficient assets when the employee attains age 65 to pay the entire expected
retirement benefit. If the plan were to terminate at any point before the
participant reaches age 65, however, there would be insufficient funds to pay the
past service benefit, and the participant would receive less at retirement than she
expected. 39 Thus, the participant would have been misled by the past service
credit award.32' The worst case scenario would occur at the end of year one. At
this point the employee's account balance would fall significantly short of that
required to provide an 11% benefit.
While the target benefit plan is the only defined contribution plan which
allows the employer to expressly award credit for prior service, past service
credit can be given implicitly in other types of defined contribution plans. For
example, in a money purchase plan an allocation of employer contributions can
be based on years of service, or on compensation.32 1 In other types of defined
contribution plans employers can take past service into account by permitting
higher deferral percentages for employees with greater lengths of service.
322
When an employer awards past service implicitly, it is more difficult to
exactly determine the portion of the employer's annual contribution attributable
to past service. Difficulty notwithstanding, it is nevertheless reasonable to
assume that some portion of the annual contribution in defined contribution plans
318. To the extent that the experience approximates the assumptions used to
determine the projected benefit, the benefits will approximate those provided under a defined
benefit plan with a benefit formula. The target benefit plan is even subject to the maximum
limits on contributions which can limit the contributions that could otherwise be made to older
participants. Id.
319. See Halperin, supra note 7, at 776-77.
320. But see id. at 772-78 (positing that we should treat past service in defined
benefit plans like we treat it in defined contribution plans, which is to allow the same funding).
321. When this approach is used, care must be taken that such formulas are not
discriminatory in favor of the highly compensated employees. See Quality Brands, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 167 (1976); See also Canan, supra note 30, at 98; see also Halperin,
supra note 7, at 776; see also Regs. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii).
322. For example 401(k) plans. See supra Part I.A.
[Vol 4:9
Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans
is made implicitly for prior service. Employers who sponsor defined contribution
plans presumably would want to reward prior service for the same reasons that
employers who sponsor defined benefit plans would. Therefore, even absent an
explicit past service credit, a participant could reasonably consider her defined
contribution plan as providing for past service when the plan is established.'
When credit for prior service is implicitly awarded, the portion of the
annual contribution attributable to past service can be estimated, if the
contribution level is known and certain assumptions are made. The annual
accrual rate can be determined by dividing the expected retirement benefit by the
participant's projected years of service. The future accrual rate can be
determined by dividing the expected retirement benefit by the total years of
projected future service. Taking the difference in these two results makes it
possible to separate the portion of the projected benefit attributable to future
earnings from the portion attributable to past earnings.
To illustrate, assume an employee with 15 years of service is age 50
when a defined contribution plan is established. Furthermore, the plan has a
normal retirement age of 65, and the plan's annual contribution formula, which
was derived with a specific income replacement goal, is 20% of compensation.
Thus, the expected retirement benefit will accrue at a rate of 20% of the
employee's annual compensation per year over the next 15 years. 2'
If the employee's future compensation and investment earnings rate on
future accruals are assumed, the expected retirement benefit can be calculated
when the plan is adopted.3" For example, if annual compensation is expected to
remain at $50,000 over the next 15 years, and an investment return on the future
contributions of 10% is assumed, the expected retirement benefit would be
$25,937."2 If the expected retirement benefit is divided by thirty, the total years
of service, the portion of the retirement benefit attributed to each year of service
can be determined. In this example each year's accrual would be $865 per
year.327 Thus, when the plan is established, the participant has already earned 15
years of accruals, or a benefit of $12,975. ,- As a result, the participant should
reasonably expect to receive at retirement a $12,975 benefit for her prior years
of service. This result occurs, however, only if some portion of each year's
annual contribution is attributable to the funding of the past service liability.
323. See Canan, supra note 30, at 174.
324. Plus an adjustment for interest.
325. If the contribution is known, the expected pension can be approximated by
making assumptions about the period of service, the employee's salary, and the earnings on the
fund. For simplicity, there is no salary scale increase used in this problem.
326. $10,000 x 1.1010 = $25,937.
327. $25,937/30 = $865.
328. $865 x 15 = $12,975.
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If the plan continues to operate over the next 15 years, the participant
would most likely be indifferent about whether any portion of the benefit was
attributable to a past service credit, or not. This is because after 15 years the
funding goal would be achieved, assuming the interest assumption were correct.
However, if the plan were to terminate earlier, there would be insufficient
contributions to cover the initial past service liability of $12,975. As a result, the
uninsured defined contribution plan participant would not receive the full past
service benefit that she expected, and perhaps had already earned.
D. The Funding Rules and Defined Contribution Plans
In defined benefit plans, the distinction between past service and future
service credits has substantial significance.329 In defined benefit plans, whether
liabilities are attributable to the future or to the past determines their tax
treatment,' 3 funding periods,33 ' and the level of insurance protection they
received.332 Although the distinction between past service and future service
theoretically exist in defined contribution plans, under current law the distinction
has no practical significance in such plans. This is even true for target benefit
plans which expressly award past service credits.
The inadequacies of the funding and insurance laws with respect to
defined contribution plans is particularly evident in money purchase plans.
Money purchase plans are subject to the minimum funding standards.333
Employers are subject to substantial penalties if the plans they sponsor fail to
comply with these rules.3" Although the applicability of the funding rules to
money purchase plans and target benefit plans may appear to provide additional
protection to plan participants against shortfalls, there is no such protection. If
a money purchase plan terminates prematurely and there have been insufficient
contributions made to fund the past service portion of the expected retirement
benefit, the participants will receive less than they expect at retirement. This
would be the same result in other defined contribution plans which are not
subject to the funding rules. Thus, the requirement that certain defined
contribution plans comply with the funding rules is misleading. Participants are
329. For example, as discussed earlier, past service must be amortized over 10 to 30
years, while current liabilities are expensed.
330. Generally, the maximum amount that an employer may deduct in a plan year is
the sum of the normal cost and an amount sufficient to amortize the unfunded past service
liability over ten years.
331. Future plan costs may not be funded in advance.
332. Future costs are not insured.
333. See IRC § 412.
334. See IRC § 4971.
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given the false impression that their expected benefits are adequately funded
since the plans are subject to ERISA's minimum funding standards.
The opportunity for misimpression is particularly well illustrated by the
target benefit plan. Although the funding standards apply to target benefit plans,
and the employer is allowed to expressly recognize prior service, there are
nevertheless no additional funding requirements. Thus, a participant's retirement
benefit could differ drastically from the targeted amount expressly stated in the
plan. To avoid this result, Congress should amend the funding rules to have
greater impact in their applicability to defined contribution plans. Similar to the
treatment of defined benefit plans, employers sponsoring defined contribution
plans subject to the funding rules should be required to annually contribute
amounts necessary to fund the past service portion of the expected retirement
benefit.
335
Admittedly, such a change is likely to have relatively little effect. As
discussed above, very few defined contribution plans explicitly award past
service credits.33 6 Consequently, only the few employers who sponsor target
benefit plans that award past service credits would be affected by the more
stringent funding requirements. Also, because the profit sharing plan, which is
the most popular type of defined contribution plan, is not subject to the funding
rules at all, such a remedy is not likely to have a meaningful impact on the
majority of plan participants now covered by defined contribution plans.
3 37
Therefore, the inadequacies of the funding rules as they apply to defined
contribution plans make the argument for defined contribution plan insurance
more compelling. Insurance protection is critically important for the retirement
security of defined contribution plan participants because the funding rules do
very little to protect them. At the very least, in defined contribution plans, the
portion of the expected retirement benefit attributed to past service should be
guaranteed. With slight modification, the Hypothetical Account Insurance Model




Participants who depend on defined contribution plans as their primary
retirement savings vehicles are exposed to substantially greater risks of shortfalls
335. For example, an employer sponsoring a target benefit plan that awarded a past
service credit, would be required to make annual contributions in pre-determined amounts to
cover the portion of the expected retirement benefit attributable to past service.
336. See supra Part IV.B.
337. See supra Part IV.C.
338. See Part III.E.
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in their expected retirement benefits than participants in defined benefit plans.
Those individuals who rely on participant directed plans are even more at risk.
Because the existing fiduciary and funding rules are inadequate as they apply to
defined contribution plans, there is a critical need for Congress to consider
amending the pension laws to be more responsive to the risks of shortfalls in
defined contribution plans. Moreover, because the gap in insurance protection
further exposes defined contribution plan participants to plan losses, a defined
contribution plan insurance program should be established.
Insuring defined contribution plans does in fact present difficult trade-
offs. However, many of the concerns regarding such a program are reactionary
rather than substantive. As for the relatively few substantive concerns, the
overwhelming need to amend ERISA to be responsive to the current pension
climate would appear to offset any difficulties that these concerns present.
Therefore, notwithstanding the complexity of implementing a defined
contribution plan insurance program, policyinakers should seriously consider
establishing an insurance program for defined contribution plans to meet the
needs of future retirees.
Frequent and significant post-ERISA amendments that
disproportionately affect defined benefit plans have led many to conclude that
increased government regulation has been the impetus for the migration away
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans.339 Moreover, the
regulations affecting defined benefit plans generally have been more burdensome
than those affecting defined contribution plans.3' ° Consequently, some skeptics
of defined contribution plan reform may fear that increased regulation of defined
contribution plans in connection with the fiduciary rules, insurance requirements,
or the funding rules would adversely impact the establishment rate of defined
contribution plans. Although frequent amendments have undoubtedly contributed
in some measure to the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans, the magnitude of the effect of governmental regulation is probably grossly
overstated.34'
An analysis of current establishment trends reveals that numerous other
factors are responsible for the shift from defined benefit plans to defined
339. See Keville, supra note 4, at 534. This trend appears to apply to all work
industries and all plan sizes. Id. at 536.
340. Id. at 535-37.
341. In some instances, new legislation affecting defined contribution plans has not
only been less burdensome but has even relaxed existing restrictions. Id. For example, shortly
after Congress increased the PBGC premiums paid by defined benefit plan sponsors in 1977,
the attractiveness of defined contribution plans increased by introducing 401(k) arrangements
making employee contributions tax deductible for the first time. The premiums were raised
again in 1986 and then again in 1990. Id.
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contribution plans. 42 Business considerations unrelated to pension plans are also
responsible for an increase in the number of defined contribution plans. The
introduction of 401 (k) plans, and greater portability of defined contribution plans
have also adversely affected the establishment of defined benefit pension plans."
Even if government regulation affecting defined benefit plans has been
more frequent than that affecting defined contribution plans, the number of
changes does not necessarily indicate the significance of those changes. For
example, while adjustments to the PBGC premium have been numerous, the
premium, per employee, has remained relatively level over the past twenty
years.? A nominal premium increase per participant is probably too small to
make a significant difference in the employer's selection of a plan." Similarly,
it is unlikely that the introduction of a relatively low premium for defined
contribution plans, or more stringent fiduciary rules in participant directed plans,
would affect the establishment of these plans. This is true especially since other
government regulations continue to place relatively smaller burdens on defined
contribution plans than on defined benefit plans.?
A 1990 PBGC study supports the conclusion that the movement toward
defined contribution plans is not solely in response to increased government
regulation of defined benefit plans or additional plan costs." Rather, the results
of the study indicate that the primary cause of the recent decline in participation
in defined benefit plans was a structural shift in the economy rather than
conscious decisions made by plan sponsors and employees." Small businesses
typically prefer defined contribution plans; while large, unionized, manufacturing
companies traditionally favor defined benefit plans." Since most of the recent
growth in American industries has occurred in the service and high technology
area, more defined contribution plans have been established.3"
342. Id.
343. Because the net increase in defined contribution plans is far greater than the net
decrease in defined benefit plans, it is reasonable to conclude that many workers, particularly
those in small firms, who currently have defined contribution plans, previously would have had
no plans at all rather than traditional defined benefit plans. Paul Yakoboski & Celia Silverman,
Baby Boomers in Retirement: What are Their Prospects?, in Retirement in the 21st Century.
Ready or Not 13.33 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones eds., 1994).
344. The premium increase is relatively small if the amounts are adjusted for
inflation.
345. See Halperin, supra note 8, at 160-61.
346. See generally, PBGC Study, Consultants Concur, Plans Will Not Vanish in
Future, Vol. 17, No. 52 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2103 (Dec. 24, 1990).
347. PBGC studies show that the shift of smaller plans toward defined contribution
plans is offset by the slight shift of larger plans toward defined benefit plans. Id.
348. See id.; see also Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan
Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 Hofstra Lab. LJ. 25, 27-29 (1991).
349. See Canan, supra note 30, at 211-13.
350. See Keville, supra note 4, at 541-42.
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